



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

October 25, 2002

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

- a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning various dossiers. Your request was received in this office on April 18, 2001.
- b. Our letter of April 20, 2001, informing you that additional time was needed to process your request and we were unable to comply to the 20-day statutory time limit.

We have conducted checks of the automated Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and a search of the Investigative Records Repository to determine the existence of Army intelligence investigative records responsive to your request.

We have located records pertaining to your request on Japanese Police Activities, ZF011108W. We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958. As a result of our review, information has been sanitized and 17 pages of records are denied in their entirety as the information is currently and properly classified CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.3(a)(3), 1.5(b) and 1.5(c) of EO 12958. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(1). It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. On March 9, 1999, the President exempted the file series in which these records are maintained from the automatic declassification provisions of EO 12958, Section 3.4, pertaining to classified records more than 25 years old. The records are enclosed for your use. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.3(a)(3) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 1.5(b) of EO 12958 provides that foreign government information shall be considered for classification protection.

Section 1.5(c) of EO 12958 provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for classification protection.

Information has been sanitized since the release of the information would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(C).

In addition, information has been sanitized from the records and the same 17 pages withheld under (b)(1) are also denied in their entirety as the release of the information would reveal the identity of confidential sources. This information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(D). The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon protection of confidential sources.

The withholding of information by this office is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General Keith B. Alexander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You may appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60 day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you filing litigation in the courts.


We have been informed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that information has been sanitized as the information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the FOIA. To aid you in identifying the CIA exempted information, we have bracketed it in black.

The withholding of the information by the CIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the Agency Review Panel within 45 days from the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Ms. Kathryn I. Dyer, Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 20505. Please explain the basis of your appeal. Cite CIA F-1999-01141 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

Fees for processing this request are waived.

If you have any questions concerning this action, feel free to contact Mrs. Reilly at (301) 677-4742. Please refer to case #828F-01.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Russell A. Nichols".

Russell A. Nichols
Chief, Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Enclosure

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

DOSSIER NO.

ZFO11108W

As of 8 Sep 81 all material included
(Date)

in this file conforms with DA policies currently
in effect.

Marie Hargrow 8 Sep 81
(Signature) (Date Signed)

Marie Hargrow GS-5
(Printed Name) (Grade)

REVIEW FOR RETENTION
CRITERIA UP AR 381-10
REVIEWER [Signature] DATE 8-8-91

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA
UP AR 381-10

REVIEWER [Signature]

DATE 9 Sept 91

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

FORMER JCP CELL MEMBERS

EMPLOYED AT THE UNITED STATES ARMY

ENGINEER SUPPLY CENTER

FAR EAST, APO 503:

NAME

POB

ADDRESS

POSITION

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cargo Checker,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Accountant, Operations
Support Branch

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(female)

Accountant, Financial
Inventory & Stock Fund
Financial Inventory
Accounting Branch

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

IBM operator, Function
Unit #32.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Accountant,
Commodity Branch,
Supply management Div.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(female)

Clerk, Posting Unit #8,
Availability Section
Outgoing Property Brnch

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Accountant, Supply
Control Div

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(female)

Supervisor, Pre-Edit
& Accounting Section,
Parts Accounting Brnch

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Clerk, Edit Section,
Outgoing Property
Branch, Stock Accounti
Div.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 APR 1999
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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15 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORMER MEMBERS OF NIPPI MOTORS CELL JCP (as of 2 Feb 56)

NAME	DOB	ADDRESS	SECTION
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Stock Control Section, Nippi Motors KK, #2 Takara-cho, Kanagawa-ku, Yokohama-shi, Kanagawa-ken
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Packing Section Nippi Mtrs
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Packing Section Nippi Mtrs
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Stock Control Nippi Mtrs
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Datchi(Translatio Section Nippi Mtr
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Packing Section Nippi Mtrs.
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Packing Section Nippi Mtrs.
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Location Section Nippi Mtrs.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 APR 1999
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 4-7

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There are two (2) known Japanese Communist Party cells within USARJ installations. The cells are located in Camp Zama-Sagamihara DMA and the Depot Complex. There are 35 identified communists involved. In addition, to these cells, there are ten (10) members of the Japan Democratic Youth League employed at Camp Zama by the National Telephone Telegraph Public Corporation. (The Japanese Democratic Youth League is a communist front organization similar to ^{the now defunct} our Young Communist League in the US).

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

[REDACTED]

So far these activities have been limited to ordinary party and local labor union movements. Actual espionage by the JCP is carried out by covert members who are not located on the installations and who do not participate in cell activities. The best technique for uncovering espionage is to keep an eye on the ordinary USARJ cell activities and to run down all leads on individuals whom the JCP members in the cell contact.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

In handling the problem of what to do about these communists employed by the command, there are several considerations and implications.

[REDACTED]

Every day 5 and 50 information reports are dispatched to USFJ, Okinawa, Eighth Army, USARFAC and other interested commands and agencies. Some of these reports are routine file checks for security clearances, visa applications, etc. Many of them are reporting valuable counterintelligence and positive intelligence information. We obtain and report information on "behind the scenes" activities at union conferences, JCP meetings, JSP meetings, and the meetings of other leftist organizations.

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To obtain an informant within a JCP cell is very difficult.

The following are courses of action that are obvious, but in some cases not feasible:

Course of Action #1

Do nothing. This course of action would have the advantage of maintaining the flow of information [REDACTED] which would allow us to keep a watchful eye on JCP activities at Sagami and Camp Zama areas. It has the disadvantage of allowing 35 members to be employed by USARJ. It could however, act as a springboard to determine the status of JCP cells located at other installations. (This figure indicates an increase of 13 members since the general's briefing, however, we learned the identity of five (5) members heretofore unidentified. This means that the two (2) cells have gained a total of nine (9) members since November 1961).

Course of Action #2

Discharge all known JCP members. This course of action has the advantage of ridding ourselves of the immediate threat. The disadvantages are:

(1) [REDACTED]

(2) Undoubtedly other cells would form within Camp Zama and Sagami but we wouldn't know anything about the new organization [REDACTED]

Course of Action #3

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Discharge all JCP members. [REDACTED]

This course

of action has the advantage of ridding ourselves of most of the communist workers on our installations while retaining, at least temporarily, our source of information. The obvious disadvantage is that the JCP would probably suspect and neutralize informant since he would be the only one to escape discharge.

Course of Action #4

Selectively discharge certain members of the cells [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This course of action has the advantages of reducing the number of communist on our installations while retaining our source of information regarding the activities of the JCP on our installations. [REDACTED]

This would have to be

accomplished in conjunction with an established RI² program.Course of Action #5

Select one (1) JCP member who has committed an overt act displaying communistic beliefs [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and process him as a security risk. [REDACTED]

This would tend to advertise to the USARJ

labor force what happens to workers who engage in subversive activities within USARJ installations.

Course of Action #6~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Select the individuals recommended for discharge [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and attempt to effect discharge for cause. This would have to be done in conjunction with the normal cases that crop up. This ~~unilateral~~ action would tend to ~~steer clear of the intent~~ keep the discharge out of the security risk procedures which could mean lengthy court action by the JCP member.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Inclosure 1 is a list of the individuals with our recommendation for
placing them in certain groups.

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is shown from the Japanese side who have information on each of the

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GROUP I: Under no circumstances will these people be fired as security risks without prior approval of CI Div. Efforts requested to protect from any normal RIF action.

[REDACTED]

GROUP II: These individuals are/have been selected for inclusion in normal RIF action and/or may be transferred and after a period of time their jobs may be classified non-essential and they may be discharged. They may not be discharged for security reasons.

[REDACTED]

GROUP III: These individuals are members of the Zentsu employed on Camp Zama by the NTTC. They hold membership in the JCP and/or its front the Minseido; CI Division does not care how they are removed from this installation, by RIF, pulling passes, security reasons, etc.

[REDACTED]

GROUP IV: Request no action be taken concerning the persons in this group, either normal rif or firing for security reasons without prior approval/coordination with CI Division.

[REDACTED]

GROUP V: Request action be taken to initiate security risk discharge in fol case:

[REDACTED]

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

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DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page (s) 13

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

DISPOSITION FORM

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)
5 USC 552 (b) (1)

FILE NO.

SUBJECT

TO Chief, CI Br, G2/3,
USARJ
APO 343

FROM OIC, CI Br, G2/3, USARJ,
Yokohama Ofc
APO 503

DATE 30 Mar 59

COMMENT NO. 1

tlk/20026 (U)

1. Reference: D/F, subject [REDACTED] Yokohama FO,
441st CIC Det, APO 503, dated 16 September 1958.

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

2. Request that O-10-1 listed in paragraph 3 be deleted and the following individual substituted therein: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is still in the development stage and his background information will be submitted in later days.

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)
(b)(7)(C)

3. Additional information on the following sources:

O-10-5 is presently employed as [REDACTED]

He is still a member of the JCP [REDACTED]

Although the cell is inactive most of the time, he reports on its activities.

O-10-9 is not a member of the JCP but because he is acquainted with a staff member of the Japan Communists League (Nippon Kyosanshugisha Domei)(JCL), O-10 utilizes him to obtain information on the organization. JCL was first organized in the summer of 1957 and its headquarters is located at 51-banchi, Yotsukaido, Chiba-shi, Chiba-ken. Its exact number of members is unknown but it is comprised of those JCP members who believes in violence and are opposed to the present JCP policy.

O-10-2 is still unrecognized by the JCP [REDACTED] as a regular JCP member because of the following reasons: [REDACTED]

He will remain as a JCP candidate and will be closely watched.

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

(b)(7)(C)

CWO.
OIC

USA

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (if any)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE NO.

SUBJECT

TO

Chief, CI Br, G2, USARJ, FROM
APO 343 OIC, CI Br, G2, USARJ,
Yokohama Ofc
APO 503

DATE 6 Feb 59

COMMENT NO. 1

tlk/20026 (U)

1. Reference: D/F, subject [REDACTED] Yokohama FO,
441st CIC Det, APO 503, dated 16 September 1958.

2. Request that the following be deleted from the list:

0-10-7 Resigned in [REDACTED]
0-10-10 Resigned on [REDACTED]
0-10-11 Riffed in [REDACTED]
0-10-17 Riffed in [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)
5 USC 552 (b) (1)

CWO
OIC

USA

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

15

DD FORM 96
1 FEB 50

REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 48, WHICH MAY BE USED

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58-905-Army-AG Admin Cen-Japan-1MM

DISPOSITION FORM

5 USC 552 (b) (1) 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)

FILE NO.

XF-3-102378 (0a)

SUBJECT

[REDACTED]

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

TO

CO,
441st CIC Det, APO 343

FROM

OIC, Yokohama FO,
441st CIC Det, APO 503

DATE 24 Sept 58

COMMENT NO. 1

1k/20026 (8)

1. Reference: D/F, subject [REDACTED] Yokohama FO,
441st CIC Det, APO 503, dated 16 September 1958.

2. Request that O-10-6 listed in paragraph 3 be deleted. On [REDACTED]
the source resigned his position and is no longer employed in an United States
Army installation.

3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

[REDACTED]

CWO
OIC

USA

16

DD FORM 96
1 FEB 50

REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 48 WHICH MAY BE USED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

58-905-Army-AG Admin Cen-Japan-1MM

DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE NO.

XF-3-102378 (0a)

SUBJECT

[REDACTED]

TO

CO,
441st CIC Det, APO 343

FROM

OIC, Yokohama FO,
441st CIC Det, APO 503

DATE

16 Sep 58

COMMENT NO. 1

tlk/20026

1. References:

a. D/F, subject [REDACTED] "Yokohama RA, Tokyo
FO, 441st CIC Group, APO 503, dated 2 December 1957.

b. D/F, subject [REDACTED] Yokohama FO,
441st CIC Group, APO 503, dated 22 January 1958.

c. D/F, subject [REDACTED] Yokohama FO, 441st
CIC Group, APO 503, dated 18 February 1958.

d. D/F, subject [REDACTED] Yokohama FO, 441st
CIC Det, APO 503, dated 13 May 1958.

e. D/F, subject [REDACTED] Yokohama FO, 441st
CIC Det, APO 503, dated 5 June 1958.

2. On 15 September 1958, a meeting between a representative of this office
and [REDACTED] During
the meeting, the current status [REDACTED]
regarding labor and subversive activities at USFJ installations was discussed
and a current list of subsources compiled.

3. The following revised listing of [REDACTED] is submitted for
your information.

JCP and Labor Informants:

0-10-1. [REDACTED] (Labor) - Employed as [REDACTED]

0-10-2. [REDACTED] (JCP) - Employed as [REDACTED]

0-10-3. [REDACTED] (JCP) - Resigned his position in [REDACTED]

0-10-4. [REDACTED] (JCP) - Resigned his position in [REDACTED]

0-10-5. [REDACTED] (JCP) - Employed as [REDACTED]
exact location unknown at the present time.

5 USC 552a (b) (1) (D)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

DD FORM 96
1 FEB 50

REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 42, WHICH MAY BE USED

Army Admin Cen-Japan

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

FILE NO. XF-3-102378 (0a)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

COMMENT NO. 1 (0)

0-10-6. [REDACTED] (JCP) - Employed as [REDACTED] *Resigned*

0-10-7. [REDACTED] (JCP) - Employed as [REDACTED] *Resigned*

0-10-8. [REDACTED] (JCP) - [REDACTED]

0-10-9. [REDACTED] (JCP) - Employed as [REDACTED]

0-10-10. [REDACTED] (JCP) - Employed as [REDACTED] *Resigned*

0-10-11. [REDACTED] (Labor) - Employed as [REDACTED] *Resigned*

0-10-12. [REDACTED] (Labor) - [REDACTED] *has reported*

0-10-13. [REDACTED] (Labor) - [REDACTED]

0-10-14. [REDACTED] (Labor) - Employed as [REDACTED]

0-10-15. [REDACTED] (Labor) - [REDACTED]

0-10-16. [REDACTED] (Labor) - [REDACTED]

0-10-17. [REDACTED] (Labor) - [REDACTED]

0-10-18. [REDACTED] (Labor) - Resigned his position [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] stated that the majority of the 0-10 subsources is still in the development stage.

5. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

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USA

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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

DISPOSITION FORM

5 USC 552 (b) (1) 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE NO.

SD-CA XF-3-102399 SD

SUBJECT

Retention of Indigenous Security Risks (U)

TO

Hq, 441st CIC Gp

FROM

Scty Div

DATE

21 Mar 58

COMMENT NO. 1

[REDACTED] rg/3-1737

1. References: a. Your D/F, XF-3-102378, Subject: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations (S), 2 Jan 58.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

b. Your D/F, XF-3-102378, Subject: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations (S), 4 Nov 57.

c. Your D/F, XF-3-102378, Subject: [REDACTED] (S), 24 Jan 58.

2. Reference a describes a [REDACTED] proposal that indigenous security risks [REDACTED] be left in place pending an emergency and asks this office's opinion of the proposal [REDACTED]

Although this office considers the continued USFJ employment [REDACTED] desirable and has agreed, as indicated in Reference b, to phase the discharge of exposed individuals to minimize the chance of [REDACTED] compromise, it cannot agree to the continued employment of whole nests of indigenous security risks for these reasons:

a. As you have stated in paragraph 4 of Reference a, "this organization certainly desires to preclude the possibility of USFJ installations becoming havens for Communists." While such individuals may not present an immediate serious threat to installations before a declaration of emergency, information already furnished by them to hostile elements might have a considerable bearing on the security of installations after the declaration. Retention of such individuals also exposes installations to higher degrees of labor unrest and dissatisfaction and facilitates the spread of Communist doctrine among untainted employees.

b. Retention of such individuals would, in some cases, require transfers to less sensitive positions. These transfers, quite apart from the personnel and administrative problems raised, would probably attract as much attention [REDACTED] as outright discharges.

3. [REDACTED]

4. In reply to Reference c, G2 USARJ has discussed [REDACTED] with the Commanding Officer, Regional Camp Zama. The latter has agreed to continue the informant's employment and to protect him against RIF so long as such retention is not obviously inconsistent with RIF policies.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SD-CA XF-3-102399 SD

SUBJECT: Retention of Indigenous Security Risks (U)

TO: Hq, 441st CIC Gp FROM: Scty Div DATE: 21 Mar 58 COMMENT NO 1 (✓)
[REDACTED] rg/3-1737

5. The above has been coordinated with, and concurred in by, G2 USARJ.

6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined. 2

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Colonel, M(Arty)
Chief, Security Division 3-1300

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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ON 20 APR 1999
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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File

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

DISPOSITION FORM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1) 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D) *44*

FILE NO.

SUBJECT

XF-3-102378 (0a)

TO CO,
441st CIC Group, APO 613
ATTN: SAB

FROM OIC, Yokohama FO,
441st CIC Group, APO 503

DATE 18 February 1958 COMMENT NO. 1

rag (C)

* WARNING *
* The dissemination of this information is restricted by the *
* provisions of paragraph 4a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, aa, ab, ac, ad, ae, af, ag, ah, ai, aj, ak, al, am, an, ao, ap, aq, ar, as, at, au, av, aw, ax, ay, az, ba, bb, bc, bd, be, bf, bg, bh, bi, bj, bk, bl, bm, bn, bo, bp, bq, br, bs, bt, bu, bv, bw, bx, by, bz, ca, cb, cc, cd, ce, cf, cg, ch, ci, cj, ck, cl, cm, cn, co, cp, cq, cr, cs, ct, cu, cv, cw, cx, cy, cz, da, db, dc, dd, de, df, dg, dh, di, dj, dk, dl, dm, dn, do, dp, dq, dr, ds, dt, du, dv, dw, dx, dy, dz, ea, eb, ec, ed, ee, ef, eg, eh, ei, ej, ek, el, em, en, eo, ep, eq, er, es, et, eu, ev, ew, ex, ey, ez, fa, fb, fc, fd, fe, ff, fg, fh, fi, fj, fk, fl, fm, fn, fo, fp, fq, fr, fs, ft, fu, fv, fw, fx, fy, fz, ga, gb, gc, gd, ge, gf, gg, gh, gi, gj, gk, gl, gm, gn, go, gp, gq, gr, gs, gt, gu, gv, gw, gx, gy, gz, ha, hb, hc, hd, he, hf, hg, hh, hi, hj, hk, hl, hm, hn, ho, hp, hq, hr, hs, ht, hu, hv, hw, hx, hy, hz, ia, ib, ic, id, ie, if, ig, ih, ii, ij, ik, il, im, in, io, ip, iq, ir, is, it, iu, iv, iw, ix, iy, iz, ja, jb, jc, jd, je, jf, jg, jh, ji, jj, jk, jl, jm, jn, jo, jp, jq, jr, js, jt, ju, jv, jw, jx, jy, jz, ka, kb, kc, kd, ke, kf, kg, kh, ki, kj, kk, kl, km, kn, ko, kp, kq, kr, ks, kt, ku, kv, kw, kx, ky, kz, la, lb, lc, ld, le, lf, lg, lh, li, lj, lk, ll, lm, ln, lo, lp, lq, lr, ls, lt, lu, lv, lw, lx, ly, lz, ma, mb, mc, md, me, mf, mg, mh, mi, mj, mk, ml, mm, mn, mo, mp, mq, mr, ms, mt, mu, mv, mw, mx, my, mz, na, nb, nc, nd, ne, nf, ng, nh, ni, nj, nk, nl, nm, nn, no, np, nq, nr, ns, nt, nu, nv, nw, nx, ny, nz, oa, ob, oc, od, oe, of, og, oh, oi, oj, ok, ol, om, on, oo, op, oq, or, os, ot, ou, ov, ow, ox, oy, oz, pa, pb, pc, pd, pe, pf, pg, ph, pi, pj, pk, pl, pm, pn, po, pp, pq, pr, ps, pt, pu, pv, pw, px, py, pz, qa, qb, qc, qd, qe, qf, qg, qh, qi, qj, qk, ql, qm, qn, qo, qp, qq, qr, qs, qt, qu, qv, qw, qx, qy, qz, ra, rb, rc, rd, re, rf, rg, rh, ri, rj, rk, rl, rm, rn, ro, rp, rq, rr, rs, rt, ru, rv, rw, rx, ry, rz, sa, sb, sc, sd, se, sf, sg, sh, si, sj, sk, sl, sm, sn, so, sp, sq, sr, ss, st, su, sv, sw, sx, sy, sz, ta, tb, tc, td, te, tf, tg, th, ti, tj, tk, tl, tm, tn, to, tp, tq, tr, ts, tt, tu, tv, tw, tx, ty, tz, ua, ub, uc, ud, ue, uf, ug, uh, ui, uj, uk, ul, um, un, uo, up, uq, ur, us, ut, uu, uv, uw, ux, uy, uz, va, vb, vc, vd, ve, vf, vg, vh, vi, vj, vk, vl, vm, vn, vo, vp, vq, vr, vs, vt, vu, vv, vw, vx, vy, vz, wa, wb, wc, wd, we, wf, wg, wh, wi, wj, wk, wl, wm, wn, wo, wp, wq, wr, ws, wt, wu, wv, ww, wx, wy, wz, xa, xb, xc, xd, xe, xf, xg, xh, xi, xj, xk, xl, xm, xn, xo, xp, xq, xr, xs, xt, xu, xv, xw, xx, xy, xz, ya, yb, yc, yd, ye, yf, yg, yh, yi, yj, yk, yl, ym, yn, yo, yp, yq, yr, ys, yt, yu, yv, yw, yx, yy, yz, za, zb, zc, zd, ze, zf, zg, zh, zi, zj, zk, zl, zm, zn, zo, zp, zq, zr, zs, zt, zu, zv, zw, zx, zy, zz

1. References: **5 USC 552a (b) (1)** **5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)**

a. D/F, subject *[redacted]* Yokohama RA, Tokyo FO,
441st CIC Group, APO 503, dated 2 December 1957.

b. Agent Report, case title "Communist Penetration of USFJ Installations,"
file GF-500009 (2/5AEI), Yokohama RA, dated 16 December 1957.

2. Request that 0-10-6 listed in paragraph 3, reference 1a be deleted and the
following individual substituted therein: *[redacted]*

3. Request the following individual be added to the list: *[redacted]*

4. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

[redacted] Major, *[redacted]* (Army)
Officer-in-Charge

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

SEC-3132

XF-3-102378(0)

Scty Div - USARISC

APO 343

ATTN: [REDACTED]

Hq, 441st CIC Gp

24 Jan 58

9497-3361

/mw

(8)

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

4. In view of the requests contained in paragraph 3, above, it is requested that this organization be advised as to what the [REDACTED] may be informed in connection with the retention of [REDACTED] in his present position at Camp Zama.

5. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

S2

Lt Col, MI(Arty)

MEMO FOR THE RECORD:

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

1. REF: NA
2. AR: Advise Yokohama office of any instructions received from Scty Div.
3. AT: Instant DF forwards information concerning [REDACTED] to Scty Div and requests made by [REDACTED] with regard to the informants retention in his present position at Camp Zama.
4. COORD: NA
5. COPIES: Normal (File Copy [REDACTED] File)
6. SUS: 30 days
7. 24 January 1958

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAB FILE COPY
WBR/MJS/MJS/mw

22

(b)(7)(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT

TO CO, 441st CIC Group,
APO 613
ATTN: SAB

FROM OIC, Yokohama FO,
441st CIC Group,
APO 503

DATE 22 January 1958 COMMENT NO. 1
[REDACTED] rag (e)

ATTN: SAB

9 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

The di
-provis

The dissemination of this information is restricted by the provisions of paragraph 48 of AIC-10. Authorized disclosure may compromise the source and/or information.

1. Reference: D/F, subject and file as above, Yokohama RA, Tokyo FO, 441st CIC Group, APO 503, dated 2 December 1957.

2.

3.

4.

5. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

Major MI (Arty) [redacted]
Officer-in-Charge

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

23

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

DISPOSITION FORM

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

FILE NO.

XF-3-102378 (0a)

SUBJECT

[REDACTED]

TO

CO,
441st CIC Det, APO 343

FROM

OIC, Yokohama FO,
441st CIC Det, APO 503

DATE

5 June 1958

COMMENT NO. 1

[REDACTED] tlk/20026 (0)

1. Reference: D/F, subject [REDACTED] Yokohama RA,
Tokyo FO, 441st CIC Group, APO 503, dated 2 December 1957.

2. Request that O-10-18 listed in paragraph 3 be deleted. On [REDACTED]
the source resigned and is no longer employed in an United States Army installation.

3. The attached copy of an untranslated document "All Security Forces Workers
Union Directive #13, Pertaining to the Opposition Struggle of the Present Personnel
Retrenchment, dated 23 May 1958" was submitted by O-10-11 and is forwarded for your
information.

4. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

[REDACTED]

1 Incl

A copy of an untranslated document

CWO
OIC

USA

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISPOSITION FORM

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

FILE NO.

XF-3-102378 (0a)

SUBJECT

TO

CO,
441st CIC Det, APO 343

FROM

OIC, Yokohama FO,
441st CIC Det, APO 503

DATE 13 May 1958

COMMENT NO. 1

[REDACTED] t1k/20026 (C)

1. Reference: D/F, subject [REDACTED] Yokohama RA.
Tokyo FO, 441st CIC Group, APO 503, dated 2 December 1957.

2. Request that O-10-2 and O-10-3 listed in paragraph 3, reference 1 be deleted. These two resigned in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] respectively and they are no longer employed in United States Army installations.

3. On 10 May 1958, an agreement was reached between a representative of this office [REDACTED]

that since O-10-12 and O-10-16 are just union officials and not United States Security Forces employees, they can be deleted from [REDACTED]. Request that these two listed in paragraph 3, reference 1 be deleted also.

4. The attached Memorandum for the Record is forwarded in compliance with verbal request.

5. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

1 Incl
Memo for the Record

CWO
OIC

USA

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 26-28

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAB-526

5 USC 552 (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

SEC-3132
XF-3-102378(C)

JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations (U)

Chief, Security Division
USARISC
APO 343
ATTN: [REDACTED]

Hq, 441st CIC Gp
APO 613

2 January 1958

[REDACTED] gam/9497-3361 (U)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

1. The spaced-out plan of discharge, which is intended to afford maximum protection [REDACTED] has been tested [REDACTED] and has met with unsatisfactory results. Although the discharge of security risks is spaced over an extended period, ultimate result is that [REDACTED] must also be discharged or compromised, resulting in an eventual drying up [REDACTED]. The extension of this plan to have the sub-source effect a transfer to another JCP cell or to another USFJ installation prior to the discharge of other JCP personalities has proved impractical and unfeasible for the following reasons:

a. A JCP cell member cannot transfer from one JCP cell to another without sufficient justification. Justification insofar as the Party is concerned, is limited to reasons of domicile or change of work site. Therefore, before the JCP will approve a transfer, the member desirous of transfer must either relocate his residence or seek employment at another location.

b. The recent reductions in force (RIF) made by USFJ have limited the number of positions available at all installations.

c. The employment system provides for re-hire of RIF'd personnel based upon seniority. If the sub-source were to be transferred to another installation, he would not be interviewed for a position unless he has seniority over the others who might be waiting.

d. Interviews with local commanders indicate that they cannot create positions [REDACTED]. All positions are subject to management audit and must be justified.

e. Although a vacancy may exist on another USFJ installation, frequently sub-sources cannot qualify for the position vacancy.

2. [REDACTED]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

SAB FILE COPY WRR/ [REDACTED] / [REDACTED] / [REDACTED] / gam

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

XF-3-102378(0) SEC-3132
SUBJECT: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations

2 January 1958

3. In order to counteract the above described situation and to possibly insure a continued flow of information vital to the security of the USFJ, the following plan of operation, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is submitted for consideration by your office:

a. That this organization continue receiving [REDACTED] regarding JCP cell coverage at USFJ installations, said information being forwarded to your office.

b. That your office, upon receiving the information, compile a separate card file listing JCP cell personalities employed at USFJ installations, and construct a support dossier for each personality based upon the reports.

c. That the personalities be permitted to remain employed at the installation until such time as the G2 declares an emergency or until their activities indicate a definite threat to the security of the USFJ installation concerned. Then, the personalities can be discharged en masse within 24 hours on security grounds.

d. [REDACTED]

4. It is axiomatic that subversive groups or individuals who are known to the USFJ do not pose as serious a threat as those that are unknown. However, the extent to which subversive groups and individuals are to be permitted to remain employed on USFJ installations [REDACTED] poses a serious problem. Since Communists are so trained and indoctrinated that they exert an influence far out of proportion to their limited numbers, the presence of even a single party member poses an obvious threat. [REDACTED]

However, this organization certainly desires to preclude the possibility of USFJ installations becoming havens for Communists.

5. Inasmuch as security is a command responsibility, the retention of subversives on an USFJ installation is of vital concern to the installation commanders. Assuming that the commander accepts such a proposal, he must be capable of placing JCP cell personalities in non-sensitive areas and positions where their potential for conducting subversive activity or actions detrimental to the security of the installation is reduced or completely neutralized. Past experience has shown that the installation commander becomes alarmed at the presence of any subversive elements

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

XF-3-102378(0) SEC-3132

SUBJECT: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations

2 January 1958

(u)
(c)

on his installation and is immediately concerned with ridding his command of these individuals as soon as possible. Not always being fully apprised of the situation, his feelings are understandable. Another factor to be considered is whether an installation commander will consent to relinquishing the command prerogative of declaring an emergency or determining whether the activities of certain subversive personalities are a definite threat to his installation.

6.

Passive counterintelligence measures, such as security surveys and security inspections, are but one small phase of the counterintelligence effort. To actively ferret out security risks before they can endanger our passive security measures is another vital phase of our operations.

7. The proposal outlined above will afford the USFJ a plan of operation

Under the latter circumstances it is probable that JCP personalities will continue to be employed on USFJ installations, but without USFJ's knowledge, with a resultant serious danger to the security of USFJ. The proposed plan, although undesirable in some respects, will insure that the USFJ is kept informed and therefore be in a position to take immediate neutralization action if and when needed.

8. It is requested that this headquarters be advised of your office's opinions regarding this matter as soon as possible so that required action on the part of this organization may be taken with the least practicable delay.

9. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

Lt Col, MI(Arty)

3 31

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

1. Reference: [REDACTED]

2. Action Required: Advise Security Division of this plan and explain that if something of this nature is not done it is likely that the flow of information [REDACTED] regarding the JCP cells on installations will cease.

3. Action Taken: Instant DF completes "Action Required" and asks for the opinion of Security Division so that this organization may take whatever action deemed necessary.

4. Coordination: S2-SAB

5. Suspense: None

6. Copies: Normal

7. 2 January 1958 [REDACTED]

for [REDACTED] Capt

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

1. The purpose of this study is to arrive at a satisfactory plan to protect [REDACTED] USFJ installations. The present plan in effect of spaced-out discharges was tested and has met with ~~unsatisfactory~~ unfavorable results. If we are to continue [REDACTED] it is imperative that we arrive at a solution that is satisfactory to all concerned.

2. The spaced-out plan of discharge, which is intended to afford maximum protection [REDACTED] has been tested [REDACTED] and has met with unsatisfactory results. Although the discharge of security risks is spaced over an extended period, ultimate result is [REDACTED] must also be discharged or compromised, resulting in an eventual drying up [REDACTED]. The extension of this plan to have the subsource effect a transfer to another JCP cell or to another USFJ installation prior to the discharge of other JCP personalities has proved impractical and unfeasible for the following reasons:

a. A JCP cell member cannot transfer from one JCP cell to ~~another~~ another without sufficient justification. Justification insofar as the Party is concerned, is limited to reasons of domicile or change of work site. Therefore, before the JCP will approve a transfer, the member desirous of a transfer must ~~seek~~ either relocate his residence or seek employment at another location.

b. The recent reductions in force (RIF) made by USFJ have limited the number of positions available at all installations.

c. The employment system provides for re-hire of RIF'd personnel based upon seniority. If the subsource were to be transferred to ~~another~~ another ~~XXXX~~ installation, he would not be interviewed for a position unless he has seniority over others who might be waiting.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

d. Interviews with local commanders indicate that they cannot create positions [REDACTED] All positions are subject to management audit and must be justified.

e. Although ~~vacancies may exist on another~~ frequently another USFJ installation, ~~most of the~~ subsources cannot qualify for the position vacancy.

3. ~~The following proposal~~ As a solution to the problem, the following proposal was presented by Yokohama RA, 441st CIC Gp, APO 503, which was concurred [REDACTED]

a. That Yokohama RA continue to receive [REDACTED] regarding JCP cell coverage at USFJ installations.

b. That the information continue to be forwarded through channels to Security Group.

c. That Security Group receive the information, compile a separate card file listing JCP cell personalities employed at USFJ installations, and prepare a support dossier for each personality based upon the reports.

d. That the personalities be permitted to remain employed at the installation until such time as the G2 declares an emergency or until their activities indicate a definite threat to the security of the USFJ installation concerned. At this time the personalities can be discharged en masse within 24 hours on security grounds.

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

4. It cannot be denied that subversive groups or individuals who are known to us do not pose as serious a threat as those that are unknown. However, the extent to which subversive groups and individuals are to be permitted to remain employed on USFJ installations [REDACTED] poses a serious problem. Since Communists are so trained and indoctrinated that they exert an influence far out of proportion to their limited numbers, the presence of even a single party member poses a real and serious threat. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However, we certainly want to preclude the possibility of USFJ installations becoming havens for Communists.

5. In ~~as much~~ as security is a command responsibility, the retention of subversives on an USFJ installation is of vital concern to the installation commanders. Assuming that the commander accepts such a proposal, he must be capable of placing JCP cell personalities in non-sensitive areas and positions where their potential for ~~xxx~~ conducting subversive activity or actions detrimental to the security of the installation is virtually impossible or highly improbable. Past experience has been that installation commanders become panicky of the presence of any subversive elements on his installation and his only concern is to get rid of them as soon as possible. Not always being fully appraised of the situation, his feelings are understandable. Another factor to be considered is whether ~~or not~~ an installation commander will consent to relinquishing the command prerogative of declaring an emergency or determining whether the activities of certain subversive personalities is a definite threat to his installation. [REDACTED]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

6. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Passive
counter intelligence measures, such as security surveys and security inspections,
~~we~~ only one small phase of our CI effort. To actively ferret out security risks
before they can endanger our passive security measures is another vital phase of
our operations. [REDACTED]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

8. [REDACTED]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

[REDACTED] however, if specific requirements are levied, there is very little information that we are unable to obtain from [REDACTED] in view of the splendid relationship that has been cultivated in the past.

8. There ~~exist~~ exists a definite need for a thorough briefing of the Chief of the CS Branch, at this headquarters. The subject and substance of this case is of direct concern and interest to his branch. Any future studies or correspondence relative to any phase of this study should be conducted in close coordination and cooperation of SAB and the CS Branch. Frequently, information relative to subject is forwarded by AR's, which go directly to the CS Branch and which may be forwarded without knowledge of the possible implications or difficulties involved if the CS Branch Chief is not thoroughly briefed.

9. There is a definite necessity for recruitment and expansion of low-level (installation level) type informants [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Generally, low-level informants are not as productive and what information they do submit frequently is not reportable. If payment of sources is based primarily on the quantity of reports submitted, ~~retention~~ retention of such sources hardly seems justifiable from a fiscal point of view. [REDACTED]

10. Enclosed herewith is Disposition Form, Yokohama RA, subject: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (C), file No. XF-3-102378 (C), dated 12 December 1957, which is the basis for this study. Also enclosed are one copy each of AR, file No. GF-500009 (2/5AEI), subject: "Communist Penetration of USFJ Installations (U), dated 10 December 1957 and 16 December 1957, containing paras 34, 35, 36 and 37. Paras 34, 35, and 36 are pertinent to this study since the personalities ~~mentioned~~ reported in these paragraphs [REDACTED] These AR, [REDACTED]

EXX

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~is~~ being held pending completion and approval of this study. *AR, dtd 10 Dec 57*
has already been forwarded.

11. The following recommendations are made:

a. That the Yokohama RA proposal, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] which is outlined in para 3 of this study, be favorably considered. Approval of this proposal will insure [REDACTED] continuous flow of information relative to Communist penetration of USFJ installations.

* b. That a concerted effort be made by this organization to develop ~~lower~~ low-level sources capable of obtaining information on CP penetration of USFJ installations [REDACTED]

* c. That any future studies relative to subject be handled in close cooperation and coordination with the CS Branch, ~~this branch~~ and SAB, this headquarters.

~~Incl:~~

3 Incl:

~~DF, Yokohama RA, dated 12 Dec 57~~

1. DF, Yokohama RA, dated 12 Dec 57

2. AR, "Communist Penetration of USFJ Installations" (U), Dtd 10 Dec 57

3. " " " , dtd 16 Dec 57

** don't send*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

DISPOSITION FORM

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE NO.

XF-3-102378 (0)

SUBJECT

[REDACTED] (C)

TO OIC, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Group
APO 613

FROM SAIC, Yokohama RA
441st CIC Group
APO 503

DATE 12 Dec 57

COMMENT NO. 1

rfk/2-0028 (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

* WARNING NOTE *
* The dissemination of this information is restricted by the *
* provisions of paragraph 43, SR 380-320-10. Unauthorized *
* disclosure may compromise the source of this information. *

1. References:

- a. Memo for Record, Yokohama RA, dated 25 April 1957.
- b. Draft Staff Study, subject: [REDACTED]
Yokohama RA, dated 27 April 1957.
- c. D/F, file No. XF-3-202011 (5b1), subject: "JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations," Tokyo FO, 441st CIC Group, APO 613, dated 22 April 1957; Comment 2, dated 27 May 1957; Comment 3, dated 28 May 1957; and Comment 4, dated 3 June 1957.
- d. D/F, file No. XF-3-202011 (5b1), subject: "JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations," Yokohama RA, dated 25 October 1957.
- e. D/F, file No. GF-500009 (2/5AEI), subject: "Communist Penetration of USFJ Installations," Yokohama RA, dated 29 November 1957.

2. Action required by Comment 2, reference 1c above, was completed. However, in practice, the plan creates unforeseen difficulties.

3. [REDACTED]

- a. Reference 1d above contained a schedule for the discharge of JCP personalities employed at the United States Army Engineer Supply Center, Far East (USAESC/FE), APO 503. Under provisions of this schedule, the discharges are

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 96

REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 48, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Army-Admin Cen-Japan

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5 USC 552a (b) (1) 5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

FILE NO. XF-3-102378 (0)
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

Comment No. 1 (C)

[REDACTED] the four JCP members of the PX Cell are discharged for security reasons. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In April 1957, KC-2035 obtained from O-20 the original information regarding the four JCP members. KC-2035 verified this information by contacting O-10 [REDACTED]. It was learned that O-10's subsource is a member of the Resident Cell and is not a member of the PX Cell. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In November 1957, JCE authorities considered discharging the four JCP personalities alleged to be members of the PX Cell. Accordingly KC-2035 was requested to recontact O-20 and O-10 so that the original information might be substantiated. [REDACTED]

5. This office has compiled a 37 page draft Agent Report regarding the JCP personalities employed at the New Japan Aircraft Company Limited (Nippi), a prime time and materials contractor for the United States Army Ordnance Depot (OOD), (Oppama), APO 503. Shortly after the information is forwarded, it is a matter of policy with higher headquarters to use the information as a basis for discharging the personalities concerned. [REDACTED]

6. It is probable that JCP Cells are operating on all USFJ installations. It is possible for this office, [REDACTED] to secure information regarding the JCP personalities employed at the majority of those installations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This new recruitment process becomes more difficult with the passage of time.

7. [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

FILE NO. XF-3-102378 (0)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (C)

Comment No. 1 (C)

8. [REDACTED]

9. [REDACTED]

10. Since most of the information regarding JCP personalities in USFJ installations [REDACTED] it is recommended that consideration be given to the following proposal [REDACTED]

a. That this office continue to receive [REDACTED] regarding JCP cell coverage at USFJ installations.

b. That the information continue to be forwarded through channels to Security Group.

c. That Security Group receive the information, compile a separate card file listing JCP cell personalities employed at USFJ installations, and construct a support dossier for each personality based upon the reports.

d. That the personalities be permitted to remain employed at the installation until such time as the G2 declares an emergency or until their activities indicate a definite threat to the security of the USFJ installation concerned. Then, the personalities can be discharged in masse within 24 hours on security grounds.

e. [REDACTED]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)
5 USC 552 (b) (1)

FILE NO. XF-3-102378 (O)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Comment No. 1 (O)

11. The preponderance of evidence regarding activities of JCP personalities employed at USFJ installations indicates that their political activity is primarily concerned with ordinary Party and local labor union movements. Actual espionage by the JCP is carried out by secret JCP members who do not participate in the cell activities. The best technique for uncovering espionage and information collecting activities is surveillance of ordinary USFJ cell activities [REDACTED]

12. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] under the latter circumstances, it is probable that JCP personalities will continue to be employed on USFJ installations but without USFJ's knowledge. Under the proposed method, at least USFJ would be kept informed and in a position to take immediate action when necessary.

13. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

[REDACTED]
Maj, MI (Arty)
Special Agent-in-Charge

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

XF-3-102378 (O)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

TO: CO, 441st CIC Gp FROM: OIC, Tokyo FO,
APO 613 441st CIC Gp
ATTN: S2 APO 613

16 December 1957 Comment #2
jhi/9497-3177

1. Comment #1 not only relates the history [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] but it also suggests that in lieu of discharging security risks employed on United States installations, the United States Forces, Japan (USFJ) establish a system designed to keep track of all security risks so that a mass discharge of them may be accomplished at the outset of an emergency. The alternative is that the USFJ will unknowingly continue to employ security risks. [REDACTED]

2. Forwarded for information and any action deemed necessary.

3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

[REDACTED]
Lt Col, MI (AGC)
OIC

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

XF-3-102378(0)

Chief, Security Division
USARISC
APO 343
ATTN: [REDACTED]

Hq, 441st CIC Gp

11 December 1957

[REDACTED] gam/9497-3361 (P)

1. On 27 November 1957, a meeting of representatives of this organization [REDACTED] was held. During the meeting, the current status of [REDACTED] labor and subversive activities at USFJ installations was discussed and a current list of sub-sources compiled.

2. The following revised listing [REDACTED] is submitted for your information:

Nippon Kyosanto (Japan Communist Party) (JCP) Informants:

0-10-1. [REDACTED]

0-10-2. [REDACTED] - No change

0-10-3. [REDACTED] - No change

0-10-4. [REDACTED]

0-10-5. [REDACTED] - No change

0-10-6. [REDACTED]

0-10-7. [REDACTED] - No change

0-10-8. [REDACTED]

0-10-9. [REDACTED] - No change

0-10-10. [REDACTED] - Added to the list as requested in reference d above.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAB FILE COPY WRR/WLB/MJC/WR/gam

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XF-3-102378(0)

11 December 1957

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (C)

Rodo (Labor) Informants:

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

0-10-11. [REDACTED] - No change

0-10-12. [REDACTED] - No change

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

0-10-13. [REDACTED]

0-10-14. [REDACTED] - No change

0-10-15. [REDACTED]

0-10-16. [REDACTED] - No change

0-10-17. [REDACTED] - No change

0-10-18. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] stated that the majority of the 0-10 sub-sources in JCP activities are still in the development stage, and only information received from 0-10-2 and 0-10-6 has been forwarded to this organization. However, [REDACTED] related that any information pertaining to USFJ developed by the sub-sources would be furnished.

4. Information supplied by 0-10 labor sub-sources is forwarded to this office on a continuing basis and is incorporated in Spot Reports and Agent Reports.

5. Pending instructions from your office this organization will take no action concerning [REDACTED]

6. Regarding data cannot be predetermined.

1. II Dep FOR THE COMMANDER:

2. Substance: None

3. Copies: None

4. Coordination: N/A

employed on USFJ installations

5. Action Taken: Instant DE [REDACTED] from Secy DIA

6. Action Required: Advise [REDACTED]

7. Reference: N/A

MEMO FOR THE RECORD:

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)
5 USC 552a (b) (1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR THE RECORD:

1. Reference: N/A
2. Action Required: Advise TFO of decision on 0-10 is an answer is received from Scty Div.
3. Action Taken: Instant DF fwd a current list [REDACTED] who are employed on USAFJ installations.
4. Coordination: N/A
5. Copies: Normal
6. Suspense: None
7. 11 Dec 57, [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

FILE NO.

XF-3-102378(0a)

SUBJECT

[REDACTED] (S)

TO

OIC, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Group
APO 613

FROM

SAIC, Yokohama RA
441st CIC Group
APO 503

DATE 2 December 1957 COMMENT NO. 1

[REDACTED] rfk/2-0028 (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

* WARNING POST *
* The dissemination of this information is restricted by the *
* provisions of Executive Order 12812-2, unauthorized *
* disclosure may compromise the source of this information. *

1. References:

a. D/F, file number XF-3-102378(0), subject: [REDACTED] (S)," Headquarters, 441st CIC Group, APO 613, dated 6 March 1957.

b. D/F, subject: [REDACTED] Yokohama RA, 441st CIC Group, APO 503, dated 14 March 1957.

c. D/F, subject: [REDACTED] Yokohama RA, 441st CIC Group, APO 503, dated 29 March 1957.

d. D/F, file number GA-C2-17(0), subject: [REDACTED] Yokohama RA, 441st CIC Group, APO 503, dated 1 November 1957.

2. On 27 November 1957, a meeting among the representatives of this office [REDACTED] was held. During the meeting, the current status of [REDACTED] labor and subversive activities at USFJ installations was discussed and a current list of subsources compiled.

3. The following revised listing [REDACTED] is submitted for your information:

Nippon Kyosanto (Japan Communist Party) (JCP) Informants:

0-10-1. [REDACTED]

0-10-2. [REDACTED] - No change

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DD FORM 1 FEB 50 96

REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 48, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Army-Admin Cen-Japan

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

(see 07-111 13 May 51)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

FILE NO. XF-3-102378(Oa)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (S)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

COMMENT NO. 1 (S)

*Revised in
see 03
let 13 May 58*

0-10-3. [REDACTED] No change

0-10-4. [REDACTED]

0-10-5. [REDACTED] No change

0-10-6. [REDACTED]

0-10-7. [REDACTED] No change

0-10-8. [REDACTED]

0-10-9. [REDACTED] No change

0-10-10. [REDACTED] Added to the list as requested in reference d above.

Rodo (Labor) Informants:

0-10-11. [REDACTED] No change

*Deleted on
see 07 let 13 May 58*

0-10-12. [REDACTED] No change

0-10-13. [REDACTED]

0-10-14. [REDACTED] No change

0-10-15. [REDACTED]

*Deleted on
see 07 let 13 May 58*

0-10-16. [REDACTED] No change

0-10-17. [REDACTED] No change

0-10-18. [REDACTED] see 07, let 5 June 58.

3, O.K. [REDACTED] stated that the majority of the 0-10 subources in JCP activities is still in the development stages, only information received from 0-10-2 and 0-10-6

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

COMMENT NO. 1 (S)

FILE NO. XF-3-102378(Oa)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (S)

has been forwarded to this office. However, [REDACTED] related that any information pertaining to USFJ developed by the subsources would be furnished this office.

11. *OK* 5. Information supplied by O-10 labor subsources is forwarded to this office on a continuing basis and is incorporated in Spot Reports and Agent Reports.

5. In attach

6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

[REDACTED]

(b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED] Maj, MI (Arty)
Special Agent-in-Charge

TO: CO
441st CIC Group
APO 613
ATTN: SAB

FROM: OIC, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Group
APO 613

DATE: 4 December 1957 COMMENT NO. 2
[REDACTED] hi/3128 (S)

(b)(7)(C)

1. Forwarded for your information.
2. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

[REDACTED]

for Lt Col, MI (AGC)
OIC

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

XF-3-102378(Oa)

OIC, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Group
APO 613

SAIC, Yokohama RA
441st CIC Group
APO 503

2 December '57
rfk/2-0028

(C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

1. References:

a. D/F, file number XF-3-102378(O), subject: [REDACTED] (O),
Headquarters, 441st CIC Group, APO 613, dated 6 March 1957.

b. D/F, subject: [REDACTED] Yokohama RA, 441st CIC Group,
APO 503, dated 14 March 1957.

c. D/F, subject: [REDACTED] Yokohama RA, 441st CIC Group,
APO 503, dated 29 March 1957.

d. D/F, file number GA-C2-17(O), subject: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Yokohama RA, 441st CIC Group, APO 503, dated 1 November 1957.

2. On 27 November 1957, a meeting among the representatives of this office
[REDACTED] was held. During the
meeting, the current status of [REDACTED]
labor and subversive activities at USFJ installations was discussed and a current
list of subsources compiled.

3. The following revised listing [REDACTED] is submitted for
your information:

Nippon Kyosanto (Japan Communist Party) (JCP) Informants:

0-10-1. [REDACTED]

0-10-2. [REDACTED]

No change

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

(b)(7)(C)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

FILE NO. XF-3-102378(0a)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (S)

COMMENT NO. 1 (S)

0-10-3. [REDACTED] No change

0-10-4. [REDACTED]

0-10-5. [REDACTED] No change

0-10-6. [REDACTED]

0-10-7. [REDACTED] No change

0-10-8. [REDACTED]

0-10-9. [REDACTED] No change

0-10-10. [REDACTED] Added to the list as requested in reference d above.

Node (Labor) Informants:

0-10-11. [REDACTED] No change

0-10-12. [REDACTED] No change

0-10-13. [REDACTED]

0-10-14. [REDACTED] No change

0-10-15. [REDACTED]

0-10-16. [REDACTED] No change

0-10-17. [REDACTED] No change

0-10-18. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] stated that the majority of the 0-10 subsources in JCP activities is still in the development stage, only information received from 0-10-2 and 0-10-6

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

FILE NO. XF-3-102378(0a)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (S)

COMMENT NO. 1 (S)

has been forwarded to this office. However, [REDACTED] related that any information pertaining to USFJ developed by the subsource would be furnished this office.

5. Information supplied by O-10 labor subsource is forwarded to this office on a continuing basis and is incorporated in Spot Reports and Agent Reports.

6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

[REDACTED] Maj, MI (Arty)
Special Agent-in-Charge

TO: CO FROM: OIC, Tokyo FO DATE: 4 December 1957 COMMENT NO. 2
441st CIC Group 441st CIC Group [REDACTED]/hi/3128 (S)
APO 613 APO 613
ATTN: SAB

1. Forwarded for your information.
2. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

[REDACTED]
Lt Col, MI (AGC)
OIC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FILE NO. SEC-3132
GF-500009(2/5AEI)SUBJECT
Communist Penetration of USFJ Installations (U)TO OIC, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Group
APO 613FROM SAIC, Yokohama RA
441st CIC Group
APO 503DATE 29 Nov 57
rfk/2-0028

COMMENT NO. 1

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

1. On 25 November 1957, [REDACTED] JES-12, Special Assistant to the Chief, Personnel Office, on Local National (LN) Affairs, Headquarters, Japan Central Exchange (JCE), United States Army Element, Ofuna, APO 503, visited this office.

2. [REDACTED] stated that the Security Officer, Headquarters, JCE, planned to initiate a request thru channels to the CIC that an investigation regarding alleged communist employees of JCE be conducted. [REDACTED] furnished this office a list containing the names of four (4) JCE employees who are reportedly members of the Nippon Kyosanto (Japan Communist Party) (JCP).

3. Based upon the information supplied by [REDACTED] this office conducted a preliminary investigation to ascertain the facts. During the investigation, KC-2035 and O-10, [REDACTED] were contacted. Both parties confirmed the information.

4. A subsequent Agent Report under pending case will be forthcoming to substantiate the allegation. The report will cite this D/F as a reference.

5. This D/F is submitted to supply the background to the official request when it reaches your office.

6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

[REDACTED]
Major, MI (Arty)
Special Agent-in-Charge

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Communist Penetration of USFJ Installations (U)
FILE NO: SEC-3132
GF-500009(2/5AEI)

TO: CO, 441st CIC Gp FROM: OIC, Tokyo FO DATE: COMMENT NO. 2
APO 613 441st CIC Gp [REDACTED] skm (2)
APO 613 9497-3177

1. Information concerning the Post Exchange Cell of the Japan Communist Party is being forwarded by Agent Report, paragraphs 34, 35, and 36, subject and file as above, dated 16 December 1957.

2. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

[Signature]
[REDACTED]
Lt Col MI (AGC)
OIC

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 APR 1999
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3 USC 552 (b) (1)
DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY CLASS

ATION (U/any)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

FILE NO.
XF-3-102378(0)

SUBJECT

TO Security Division-ISC
ATTN: [REDACTED]

FROM Hq, 441st CIC Group

DATE 5 Nov 57

COMMENT NO. 1

[REDACTED] cja/9497-3361 (S)

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] is a member of the JCP and was associated with the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] joined the cell and is still a cell member. In addition to supplying data regarding the JCP, [REDACTED] also furnishes information regarding the Zama Branch, Zen Churo.

4. [REDACTED]

5. In view of the above, request that [REDACTED] name be added to the list furnished [REDACTED] your office, and that he not be dismissed from USFJ employment for JCP or subversive activities.

6. [REDACTED] was instructed to hold the files check request in abeyance pending a reply to paragraph 5, above. Request that your office notify this headquarters after appropriate action has been taken so that this organization can, in turn, notify [REDACTED]

7. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

[REDACTED] Lt Col, MI(Arty)

56

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 96

REPLACES NMF FORM 20, 1 OCT 49, WHICH MAY BE USED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)
5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

SD-CA XF-3-102399 SD-CA

SUBJECT: Request for Protection (U)

TO: Hq, 441st CIC Gp FROM: Scty Div

DATE: 12 Nov 57 COMMENT NO 2 (U)
nm/3-1737

1. The following is furnished for information and appropriate action in response to paragraph 6, Comment No 1, above:

a. This office requested a national agency check of the individual mentioned in Comment No 1, above, on 7 Oct 57.

b. Pending notification from your office that this individual's name should be dropped from the list referred to in paragraph 5, Comment No 1, above, this office will take no further action on the individual.

2. This comment in and of itself is UNCLASSIFIED.

[REDACTED]
Colonel, MI (Arty)
Chief, Security Division 3-1300

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

TO: OIC, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Gp

FROM: Hq, 441st CIC Gp

20 November 1957 COMMENT NO.3 (U)
gam/9497-3361

1. Comment 2, above, is forwarded for your information.

2. Your office may notify [REDACTED] that steps have been taken to keep [REDACTED] from being dismissed for security reasons. He may, at his convenience, complete the files check and return it to his higher headquarters.

3. Desire that this headquarters be kept informed of future activities of [REDACTED] and in particular his pending transfer [REDACTED] This correspondence should be returned for inclusion in SAB files.

4. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[REDACTED]
Maj. Gen. (Arty)
Lt Col, MI(Arty)

2

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)


FILE NO: XF-3-102378 (0)


SUBJECT: 

TO: SAIC, Yokohama RA FROM: OIC, Tokyo FO DATE: 21 Nov 57 COMMENT NO. 4
Tokyo FO, 441st CIC Gp 441st CIC Gp  9497-3128 ~~(S)~~
APO 503 APO 613


1. Reference is made to paragraphs 2 and 3, Comment No. 3, above.
2. Forwarded for your information and necessary action.
3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)


Major, MI (CE)
Actg OIC

TO: OIC, Tokyo FO FROM: SAIC, Yokohama RA DATE: 9 Dec 57 COMMENT NO. 5 ~~(S)~~
441st CIC Gp 441st CIC Gp  /rfk/2-0028
APO 613 APO 503

1. Action required by paragraph 2, Comment 3 has been completed.
2. Attached correspondence returned for inclusion in SAB files.
3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

~~(S)~~ 
Maj, MI (Arty)
Special Agent-in-Charge

TO: SAB. Thru S2 From OIC
1 tgy 3d cpr 9p. DetC

Comment 6
11 Dec 57

1. Forwarded for filing
2. ~~REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

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S-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

DISPOSITION FORM

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

2 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

FILE NO.

GH-C2-17(0)

SUBJECT

TO OIC, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Gp
APO 613

FROM SAIC, Yokohama RA
441st CIC Gp
APO 503

DATE 1 Nov 57

COMMENT NO. 1

rfk/2-0028

(6)

*
*
* The following information was furnished by the
* provided to the [redacted] and authorized
* disclosure of this information.
*

1. [redacted]

2. [redacted]

3. [redacted] is a member of the JCP and was associated with the [redacted]

[redacted] joined the cell and is still a cell member. In addition to supplying data regarding the JCP, [redacted] also furnished information regarding the Zama Branch, All Security Force Workers Union (Zen Churo).

4. [redacted]

5. In view of the above, [redacted] requested this office to notify higher headquarters regarding [redacted] position so that he will not be discharged for security reasons in event the files check request was initiated in order to confirm [redacted] subversive activities.

6. [redacted] is notified to hold the files check request in abeyance pending a reply to paragraph 5, above.

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DD FORM 96
1 FEB 50

REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 46, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Army Admin Cen Japan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

COMMENT NO. 1 (C)

7. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

[REDACTED]

Maj, MI (Arty)

Special Agent-in-Charge

TO: CO, 441st CIC Gp FROM: OIC, Tokyo FO DATE 4 Nov 57 COMMENT NO. 2
APO 613 441st CIC Gp [REDACTED] /gkm/3128 (C)
ATTN: SAB APO 613

1. Forwarded for your information and necessary action.
2. Your attention is directed to paragraphs 5 & 6, Comment No. 1 and the specific requests therein. Request prompt action be taken in this case.
3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

[REDACTED]

Major MI (CE)
Actg OIC

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISPOSITION FORM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE NO.

XF-3-202011 (5b1)

SUBJECT

JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations (u)

TO

OIC, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Group
APO 613

FROM

SAIC, Yokohama RA
441st CIC Group
APO 503

DATE

25 Oct 57

COMMENT NO. 1

rfk/2-0028 (u)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

1. Reference: D/F, subject and file as above, Yokohama RA, dated 14 October 1957.
2. On 22 October 1957, representatives of this office met [REDACTED] to discuss a plan for the discharge of Nippon Kyosanto (Japan Communist Party) (JCP) personalities employed at the United States Army Engineer Supply Center, Far East (USAESC/FE), APO 503, a USFJ installation.
3. [REDACTED] recommended that the following plan for discharges be implemented with each person being discharged at an interval of 30 days beginning on 30 November 1957:

- a. To be discharged on 30 November 1957.

- b. To be discharged on 31 December 1957.

- c. To be discharged on 31 January 1958.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

FILE NO. XF-3-202011 (5b1)

SUBJECT: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations (S)(u)

COMMENT NO. 1 (S)
(Cont'd)

d. To be discharged on 28 February 1958.

e. To be discharged on 31 March 1958.

f. To be discharged on 30 April 1958.

g. To be discharged on 31 May 1958.

h. To be discharged on 30 June 1958.

4. The other JCP personalities reported in paragraph 17, Agent Report, file number GF-500009 (2/5AEI), Yokohama RA, dated 9 July 1957, may be discharged for security reasons at the convenience of the USFJ.

5. Based on past activities, it is probable that the Sagami-hara Branch, All Security Forces Workers Union (Zen Churo) will attempt to organize a strike in protest to the security discharges. Particularly, the discharge of [redacted] and [redacted] will more than likely cause the union to initiate a strike action.

6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

62 [redacted]
Major, MI (Arty)
Special Agent in Charge

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

SUBJECT: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations (S)(u)

TO: S2, (SAB)
441st CIC Gp
APO 613

FROM: OIC, Tokyo FO
APO 613

DATE: 28 Oct 57 COMMENT NO. 2 (U)
[REDACTED] jhi/9497-3177

1. Forwarded for your information and action deemed necessary.
2. This comment in and of itself is UNCLASSIFIED.

CIC

, Lt Col, MI(Arty)

ty)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 APR 1999
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

63
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE NO.

XF-3-202011 (5b1)

SUBJECT

JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations (c)(u)

TO OIC, Tokyo FO, 441st CIC Group, APO 613
FROM SAIC, Yokohama RA, Tokyo FO, 441st CIC Gp, APO 503
DATE 14 Oct 57
COMMENT NO. 1
rfk/2-0028 (c)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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The disposition of

information is

classified as

dissemination.

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

1. References:

a. D/F, subject and file as above, Tokyo FO, 441st CIC Group, APO 613, dated 22 April 1957; Comment 2, dated 27 May 1957; Comment 3, dated 28 May 1957; and Comment 4, dated 3 June 1957.

b. Draft staff study, subject: [REDACTED]
Yokohama RA, dated 27 April 1957. Copy attached as Inclosure No. 1.

c. Paragraph 17, Agent Report, file No. GF-500009 (2/5AEI), Yokohama RA, dated 9 July 1957.

2. On 27 September 1957, this office was notified by your office that two Nippon Kyosanto (Japan Communist Party)(JCP) personalities [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] who were reported in reference 1c, were scheduled for discharge from the United States Army Engineer Supply Center, Far East (USAESC/FE), APO 503, a United States Security Forces Japan (USFJ) installation, on 30 September 1957 and 30 October 1957 respectively.

3.

4.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

FILE: XF-3-202011 (5b1)

SUBJECT: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations (S)(u)

Comment No. 1 (S)
(continuation)

5. [REDACTED]

6. [REDACTED]

Further discussions will be held in an effort to obtain a plan for the discharge of JCP personalities at USAESC/FE. The plan will be forwarded as soon as it is received.

7. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

1 Incl:

Draft staff study
dtd 27 Apr 57.

[REDACTED]
Major, MI (Arty)
Special Agent-in-Charge

TO: CO
441st CIC Gp
APO 613
ATTN: S2

FROM: CIC, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Gp

DATE: 22 Oct 57
[REDACTED] hi/9497-3128

COMMENT NO. 2 (S)

1. Forwarded for your information and any action deemed necessary.
2. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

1 Incl
n/c

for [REDACTED] *Capt. N. S. (by)*
Major, MI (CE)
Actg OIC

65
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE: S2

8 Aug 57

SUBJECT: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations

1. Reference AR, Subject as above, file number XF-3-202011(5b1), from Tokyo Field Office, dated 29 Apr 57.

2. On 7 Aug 57, a meeting was held at Security Division for the purpose of discussing the individuals listed in the above reference AR. Persons present at the meeting were, [REDACTED] Security Division and [REDACTED] this organization.

3. [REDACTED] stated that the Loyalty Review Board was meeting sometimes next week and he wanted to find out the desires of this organization on how we wanted the persons mentioned in reference above handled. Close coordination necessary to avoid compromise to the source of information.

4. There is a JCP cell at the US Army Engineer Supply Center, Far East and the source [REDACTED] has submitted ~~xxx~~ derogatory info on all members of the cell with the exception of himself. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Our problem is, what method will best get rid of these individuals and not compromise [REDACTED]

5. Based on the information available, [REDACTED] stated that he was almost certain that they could have [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] fired for security reasons. However, due to the lack of information and [REDACTED] little derog info, the case on [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] would in all probability be ~~xx~~ thrown out and they would not be fired. (These six persons will not know that they have been "before" the board until the Labor Office hands them their pink slips.)

6. The following was agreed upon by representatives of this organization and Security Division:

a. [REDACTED] will place before the board, two of the names which he feels will not be fired. That will show that the cases are ~~xxx~~ being processed ~~xx~~ and that their cases are not being "pidgeon holed."

b. [REDACTED] will check with the Engineer Supply Center to see where the individuals stand in regards to RIF and we might be able to discharge one or more in that way. In the event we can, a notation will go in the individual's ~~xxxx~~ dossier and he would never be rehired by US Forces, Japan.

c. [REDACTED] will check with his source [REDACTED] to determine possibility of putting the entire list up before the Board at once. [REDACTED]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (7)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

~~XXXXX~~
d. One name ~~XXXXX~~ or ~~XXXXX~~ will be placed before the board each month - effective next month ~~XXXXX~~. This spread is considered by the undersigned to give source a chance to cover his tracks. ~~XXXXX~~ Names of these individuals will be "sandwiched" in between several ~~in~~ persons. As a point of information, the Security Review Board fires on the average of 20-25 persons each month and very few of them reclamation.

7. According to ~~XXXXX~~ source would not have to appear as a witness should one of the discharged persons decide to take his story before a court.

8. ~~XXXXX~~ further stated that ~~XXXXX~~ (the girl who appeared on the ~~XXXXX~~ radio ~~XXXXX~~ and stated that CIC tried to recruit her as a spy; ~~XXXXX~~ was the one who tried) was going to be fired just as soon as they can get the report ~~XXXXX~~. ~~XXXXX~~ ~~XXXXX~~ G-5 is pushing Security Division to get rid of her and her name will appear before the next board.

~~XXXXX~~
1st Lt
SAB

~~XXXXX~~
Inf

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

67
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

26 Jun 57

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Security Group, was contacted on 25 Jun 57 by the undersigned.

The dismissal of 6 JCP members at Sagami-hara was also discussed and it was pointed out to [REDACTED] that mass dismissal of the 942 individuals would compromise [REDACTED] agreed that should they have to dismiss the individuals (should enough evidence be produced) they would stagger the dismissals to preclude compromise to source. He also agreed to notify this organization ~~xxx~~ when the people come up for dismissal in order to give this organization a chance to perform a bit of local level coordination [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] pointed out that the Discharge Review Program would, in several months, come under USARPAC and that they might not go along with the program as it is now set up [REDACTED] but time will determine that. Also, if installations close down due to the retrenchment, the possibility for compromise might be lessened considerably if some of these six persons are RIFed.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

1st Lt
SAB

Inf

PS

Coordination with CS, this date, and AR concerning the six individuals are being prepared for transmittal to Security Group.

WRP

68
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE NO.

GF-500032(3/4)

SUBJECT

Security Weakness, Koshiba and Hakozaki
Petroleum Terminals (S)(U)TO OIC, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Group

FROM Hq, 441st CIC Group

DATE 24 June 1957

COMMENT NO. 1

bm
9497-3361

1. Reference, Disposition Form, Subject and file as above, dated 28 May 1957.
2. Paragraph 2, reference 1, above, requested that your office attempt to fill the existing job vacancies at the Koshiba and Hakozaki Petroleum Depots. It further requested that the names be forwarded to this headquarters, so that their employment could be facilitated.
3. Desire your office submit a report concerning the status of this project and the names of the informants, if available.
4. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Maj, MI (OrdC)
S2TO: OIC, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Gp
APO 613FROM: SAIC, Yokohama RA
Tokyo FO
441st CIC Gp
APO 503

26 June 57 COMMENT NO. 2

1.

2.

3. Primarily the major problem is that only one position vacancy is available and that position is not properly located.

DD FORM 96
1 FEB 50

REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 48, WHICH MAY BE USED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

67-125-Army-AG Admin Cen-Japan-25MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE NO: GF-500032(3/4)

SUBJECT: Security Weakness, Koshiba and Hakozaki
Petroleum Terminals (S)(u)

Comment No. 2 (S)
(Continuation)

4. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

[REDACTED]

Major, MI (Arty)
Special Agent-in-Charge

TO: Hq, 441st CIC Group FROM: OIC, Tokyo FO DATE: 26 Jun 57 COMMENT NO. 3
ATTN: SAB 441st CIC Group [REDACTED] woc/3146 (S)

1. Forwarded in compliance with para 3, Cmt #1, your headquarters.
2. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

[REDACTED]

Major, MI (CE)
S2

TO: OIC, Tokyo FO FROM: Hq, 441st CIC Gp 12 July 1957 COMMENT NO. 4
441st CIC Gp [REDACTED] gam/9497-3361 (S)

1. It is desired that Yokohama Resident Agency contact the Commanding Officer, Koshiba and Hakozaki Petroleum Terminals, to determine the reason why coordination was not effected prior to hiring local nationals to fill vacancies which existed during May 1957. This headquarters was informed that seven (7) vacancies existed at that time and that the Commanding Officer of the two depots was desirous of having these positions filled with [REDACTED] in order to impede or stop acts of sabotage at the depots.

2. This action should be accomplished as quickly as possible.
3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

70² [REDACTED] *Capt. M. J. (Arty)*
[REDACTED] JR, Maj, MI (OrdC)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GF-500032(3/4)

SUBJECT: Security Weakness, Koshiba and Hakozaki Petroleum Terminals (c) (u)
TO: SAIC, Yokohama RA FROM: OIC, Tokyo FO 13 July 1957 COMMENT NO. 5 (c)
Tokyo FO 441st CIC Group woc/3146
441st CIC Group APO 613
APO 503

1. Forwarded for compliance with para 2 and 3, Cmt #4.
2. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

[REDACTED]

Major, MI (Arty)
OIC

TO: OIC, Tokyo FO FROM: SAIC, Yokohama RA 16 July 1957 COMMENT NO. 6 (c)
441st CIC Gp 441st CIC Group /rfk/2-0028
APO 613 APO 503

1. In May 1957, the Commanding Officer of the Koshiba and the Hakozaki Petroleum Terminals stated that seven (7) vacancies existed at these Terminals. To employ personnel to fill these vacancies it was necessary to verify vacancies through the Civilian Personnel Office and obtain their approval. This action was taken, but the Civilian Personnel Office records indicated that only one (1) vacancy was available at the two (2) terminals. The discrepancy was the difference in vacancies shown by records at the Petroleum headquarters and those at the Civilian Personnel Office and not in the lack of coordination as indicated in your Comment #4.
2. At the present time, efforts are being made by O-10 to locate sources who are already employed at the terminals, in addition to locating an individual to fill the present vacancy. As soon as any progress is made available, information will be forwarded.
3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

[REDACTED]

Major, MI (Arty)
Special Agent-in-Charge

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 APR 1999
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

3
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GF-500032(3/4)

SUBJECT: Security Weakness, Koshiha and Hakozaki Petroleum Terminals (S)(u)

TO: CO, 441st CIC Group FROM: OIC, Tokyo FO DATE: 16 July 1957 COMMENT NR. 7
APO 613 441st CIC Group [REDACTED] /woc/3146 (S)

1. Forwarded in compliance with para 1, Cmt #4.
2. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

[REDACTED]

Major, MI (Arty)
OIC

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 APR 1999
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

MEMORANDUM FOR: S2

10 May 1957

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (S)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

1. A meeting was held at Security Group, this date, for the purpose of discussing information received from [REDACTED] 10-10. [REDACTED]

The following persons were present: [REDACTED] of Security Group, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] this headquarters.

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] explained that all the installation commanders contacted exhibited complete agreement [REDACTED]. In fact, some have agreed to give the sources a new job, should RIF action be contemplated. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

5. Security Group is going to give us a DF giving us guidance [REDACTED]

6. In brief, the primary question of retention of JCP members on USFJ installations, is ~~to be on~~ that the Security Forces cannot agree to any such policy, but that if these people are sources [REDACTED] we will do what we can to protect them. This will be forthcoming in writing from Security Group. [REDACTED]

73 1st Lt Inf
Source Analysis Branch

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

TAB
M
R
P
J

DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

FILE NO. XF-3-202011(5b1)	SUBJECT JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations (S)(u)	TO Security Group ATTN: [REDACTED]	FROM Hq, 441st CIC Gp	DATE 29 April 1957 [REDACTED] gam/9497-3361	COMMENT NO. 1 (9)
------------------------------	--	--	--------------------------	---	----------------------

1. The following information has been received from a source of this organization and is forwarded for your information and any action deemed necessary:

a. Late in 1956, an agent of this organization obtained information of a derogatory nature concerning [REDACTED]

b. Later, a National Agency Check was conducted at the request of your office. The results of this check indicated that there was no derogatory information available concerning the above individuals.

c. On 15 April 1957, source was again contacted and asked to furnish verification of derogatory information concerning the six (6) persons in question. Derogatory information concerning [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was produced, however, nothing derogatory could be located concerning the other three (3) persons. At the time of this request, source advised that he was willing to submit any and all information pertaining to the JCP, JCP personalities, and related information which pertains to JCP members who are employed on United States Forces Japan installations. This could be accomplished provided assurance could be given him that the JCP members and sympathizers would not be discharged from their present employment. Source attempted to justify this statement by the fact that in 1954 he submitted the names of JCP members and sympathizers employed at the Japan Engineer Supply Center who were promptly discharged. [REDACTED]

d. At the present time, source is willing to supply information only in the event this organization has previous substantiating data pertaining to JCP personalities who are employed on USFJ installations. In this connection, the installations at which there are JCP cells and the number of JCP members employed on USFJ installations has been reported, but the identity of the individuals is being withheld until source can be assured that none of these persons will be discharged. Source justifies this attitude by the following:

(1) [REDACTED]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

08876
07000

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 96

REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 48, WHICH MAY BE USED.

67-125-Army-AG Admin Cen-Japan-2.5MM

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XF-3-202011(5b1)

29 April 1957

SUBJECT: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

(2)

2. Source feels that the best solution is to allow the subversives to remain employed on USFJ installations so that he will be in a position to observe their activities and report to this organization without fear of compromise.

3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

Maj, MI (OrdC)

S2

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

FILE: GF-500009 CS

TO: CO, 441st CIC Gp FROM: Scty Gp DATE: 14 May 57 COMMENT NO 2 (S)
ATTN: S2 ef/9497-3159

1. Reference: Conference at this office, 10 May 57, between [redacted] of your headquarters and [redacted], during which the problem raised in Comment No 1, above, was discussed.

2. [redacted]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

08876
07552

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3 USC 552 (b) (1)

FILE: GF-500009 CS

SUBJECT: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations (S)(u)

TO: CO, 441st CIC Gp FROM: Scty Gp DATE: 14 May 57 COMMENT NO 2 (S)

ATTN: S2

f/9497-3159

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

[REDACTED] (d) that, however, when several security discharges at a single installation are indicated, such discharges may be spaced out over a period of time if this is necessary to minimize the chances of compromising [REDACTED]. It is believed that the above explanation should solve the problem [REDACTED]

3. With reference to paragraph 1 d (2), Comment No 1, above, the likelihood that source would be called as a witness appears remote. To our knowledge, this has never happened in past security discharge appeals. Since the USFJ flatly refuse any involvement in such appeals, there is no danger that source would be compromised from that quarter.

4. [REDACTED]

5. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2:

[REDACTED] Colonel, MI (ARTY)
Chief, U.S. Army Scty Gp, FE, 9497-3411

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

29 April 1957

XF-3-202011(5b1)

SUBJECT: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations

(2)

2. Source feels that the best solution is to allow the subversives to remain employed on USFJ installations so that he will be in a position to observe their activities and report to this organization without fear of compromise.

3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

S2

Maj, MI (OrdC)

FILE: GF-500009 CS

TO: CO, 441st CIC Gp FROM: Scty Gp DATE: 14 May 57 COMMENT NO 2 (g)
ATTN: S2 ef/9497-3159

1. Reference: Conference at this office, 10 May 57, between [redacted] of your headquarters and [redacted] during which the problem raised in Comment No 1, above, was discussed.

2. [redacted]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

08876

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

FILE: GF-500009 CS

SUBJECT: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations (S)(u)

TO: CO, 441st CIC Gp FROM: Scty Gp DATE: 14 May 57 COMMENT NO 2 (C)

ATTN: S2

er/9497-3159

[REDACTED] (d) that, however, when several security discharges at a single installation are indicated, such discharges may be spaced out over a period of time if this is necessary to minimize the chances of compromising [REDACTED]. It is believed that the above explanation should solve the problem [REDACTED]

3. With reference to paragraph 1 d (2), Comment No 1, above, the likelihood that source would be called as a witness appears remote. To our knowledge, this has never happened in past security discharge appeals. Since the USFJ flatly refuse any involvement in such appeals, there is no danger that source would be compromised from that quarter.

4. [REDACTED]

5. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2:

[REDACTED] Colonel, MI (ARTY)
Chief, U.S. Army Scty Gp, FE, 9497-3411

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

XF-3-202011(5b1)

JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations (c) (u)

Security Group

Hq, 441st CIC Gp

29 April 1957

ATTN: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] /gam/9497-3361 (c)

1. The following information has been received from a source of this organization and is forwarded for your information and any action deemed necessary:

a. Late in 1956, an agent of this organization obtained information of a derogatory nature concerning [REDACTED]

b. Later, a National Agency Check was conducted at the request of your office. The results of this check indicated that there was no derogatory information available concerning the above individuals.

c. On 15 April 1957, source was again contacted and asked to furnish verification of derogatory information concerning the six (6) persons in question. Derogatory information concerning [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was produced, however, nothing derogatory could be located concerning the other three (3) persons. At the time of this request, source advised that he was willing to submit any and all information pertaining to the JCP, JCP personalities, and related information which pertains to JCP members who are employed on United States Forces Japan installations. This could be accomplished provided assurance could be given him that the JCP members and sympathizers would not be discharged from their present employment. Source attempted to justify this statement by the fact that in 1954 he submitted the names of JCP members and sympathizers employed at the Japan Engineer Supply Center who were promptly discharged. [REDACTED]

d. At the present time, source is willing to supply information only in the event this organization has previous substantiating data pertaining to JCP personalities who are employed on USFJ installations. In this connection, the installations at which there are JCP cells and the number of JCP members employed on USFJ installations has been reported, but the identity of the individuals is being withheld until source can be assured that none of these persons will be discharged. Source justifies this attitude by the following:

(1) [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

29 April 1957

XF-3-202011(5b1)

SUBJECT: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations

(2)

2. Source feels that the best solution is to allow the subversives to remain employed on USFJ installations so that he will be in a position to observe their activities and report to this organization without fear of compromise.

3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

S2

Maj, MI (OrdC)

MEMO FOR THE RECORD:

1. Reference: N/A
2. Action Required: Scty Gp to accomplish appropriate action.
3. Action Taken: Instant DF informs Scty Gp that O-10 [REDACTED] will not furnish names of JCP personalities employed on USFJ installations unless they are previously known to this organization or unless source is assured that none of them will be discharged and provides source's reasons.
4. Coordination: TFC-SAR
5. Copies: Normal
6. 29 Apr 57 [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)
5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Duplicate of~~
~~Page 80~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

GF-500032(3/4)

Security Weaknesses, Koshiba and Hakozaki
Petroleum Terminals (S)(U)

OIC, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Gp

Hq, 441st CIC Gp

28 May 1957

gam/9497-3361

1. References:

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

a. Letter, Headquarters, United States Army Petroleum Depot, Far East,
Subject: CIC Survey at Certain Petroleum Terminals (U), File Number PDCO 333,
dated 13 May 1957.

b. Disposition Form, this headquarters, Subject: Possible Sabotage (U),
XF-3-9120005, dated 17 May 1957.

c. Conversation on 22 May 1957 between [REDACTED] S/A [REDACTED] Tokyo
Field Office and [REDACTED] this headquarters.

2. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Desire names and identifying data of sources placed in depot in order to expedite employment processing through Security Group. Sources should be qualified to fill existing vacancies. Keep this headquarters informed of all developments in this matter.

3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JR, Maj, MI (OrdC)

S2

MEMO FOR THE RECORD:

1. Reference: Ref 1a, above, req a CIC survey at the two depots mentioned above in order to determine if recent losses of gasoline are intentional. Ref 1b, above, directed TFO to contact the depot commander for more info. Ref 1c, during conversation between [REDACTED] S/A [REDACTED] TFO and [REDACTED] this hqs, it was pointed out that seven vacancies existed in the depot and the commander was desirous of having the positions filled with [REDACTED] someone who could help in stopping the losses of fuel. The depot commander is more concerned with future losses rather than what has been lost or ruined in the past.

2. Action Taken: [REDACTED]

3. Action Required: [REDACTED] furnish list of sources employed and to keep this hqs informed of all developments.

4. Coordination: GS-SAB-TFO-Scty Gp

5. Copies: [REDACTED] plus copy for [REDACTED]

6. 28 May 57, [REDACTED]

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Yokohama RA, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Gp
APO 503

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

27 April 1957
[REDACTED]

Staff Study

File CIS-709
XF-3-202011 (5b1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Problem: An integral part of the mission of the Yokohama RA, Tokyo FO, 441st CIC Group, APO 503, is the obtaining and reporting of information regarding Japanese nationals employed on United States Security Forces Japan (USFJ) installations who are known members of the Nippon Kyosanto (Japan Communist Party) (JCP), suspected members of the JCP, or JCP sympathizers, their membership in JCP Cells operating on USFJ installations, the mission of individual cell members and the overall mission of the cell, and other specific EEI as listed in appropriate lead sheets.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] "A", feels that whenever the CIC receives incriminating information concerning a JCP member employed on a USFJ installation and the information is reported by CIC to higher headquarters, it is the rule that the JCP members and/or sympathizers are discharged from the USFJ installation.
[REDACTED]

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (C)

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In order to alleviate this situation, A proposes that the CIC agree to the proposition that in certain cases, the JCP members and sympathizers not be released from their employment, and that prior to any JCP members being discharged from the USFJ installations in A's area, CIC coordinate with A to insure that the release of the individuals will not cause undue harm [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

It is not within the jurisdiction of this office to enter into an agreement as proposed by A.

Assumptions: That A desires to continue cooperating with CIC in the release of information but that future cooperation by A is somewhat dependent upon the obtaining of a satisfactory agreement and working arrangement with CIC regarding the subject matter of this study.

Facts Bearing on the Problem: That an agreement has been entered into between Security Group, AFPE/8A (Rear), APO 343, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to the effect that if A supplies a listing of sub-sources who are members of the JCP and employed on USFJ installations, then those sources will be protected by USFJ and not released from their employment. This listing has been furnished Security Group [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] should any representative of the CIC approach A for information, A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] will discuss the request with CIC and furnish information deemed appropriate. [REDACTED] protect A from the type of circumstances that might occur, have occurred, and as are pointed out in the discussion below.

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5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

That the agreement entered into between Security Group and A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is not entirely satisfactory.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

That past experience tends to bear out the contention that CIC obtains better results in obtaining the desired information if CIC is able to work directly with A.

That CIC presently, at least the Yokohama RA, does not have any sources of information supplying the identical data to that supplied by A.

That the present and future prospects of the Yokohama RA recruiting its own sources to replace or augment those of A is not gratifying.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Discussion: On 14 April 1957, the Yokohama RA received instructions via D/F, subject: "JCP PENETRATION OF US/UN INSTALLATIONS", file CIS-709, XF-3-202011(5b1), Headquarters, 441st CIC Group, APO 613, dated 4 April 1957 and Comment No. 1, Tokyo FO, 441st CIC Group, APO 613, dated 8 April 1957, that the reliability of A be determined and that the basis for certain classifications assigned by A to listed persons (Japanese nationals) also be determined in addition to the

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5 USC 552a (u) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

determining of additional derogatory information pertaining to the persons listed. This office contacted A in order to comply with the instructions received.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] A is in possession of information that indicates that there are approximately five JCP Cells operating on X installation. The JCP members of the cells are to some extent known to A, as are the present activities and JCP instructions to the cells. The information desired by this office related directly to some of the persons involved in the cell activities on X installation. Consequently, A inquired as to why the CIC was interested in obtaining information pertaining to these specific persons. A questioned the representative of this office to ascertain whether or not the information released by A would be used by higher headquarters as a basis for discharging the persons. A then expressed the hope that the persons concerned would not be released by USFJ because:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

5 USC 552a (b) (1) 5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

At a subsequent meeting of A and a representative of this office [REDACTED] expressed fear that the information released by A to the CIC would be used to discharge the persons concerned. A then stated the following:

A realizes that X installation cannot tolerate the mass employment of JCP members and sympathizers, nor does A believe that this should be done merely in an effort to keep an eye on the JCP members and activities. However, CIC should coordinate the discharge of members and sympathizers on X installation with A. Particularly, at this time, the persons known to A and the CIC and who are the subjects of CIC's information request, should not be discharged because it is apt to delay A's obtaining information regarding the identities of JCP members and/or sympathizers active in the five JCP Cells on X installation;

In this particular instance, A fears that it is possible for CIC now to be in possession of information that marks every individual in the one known cell of the five cells on the X installation. Should all the members of the cell be discharged, except the sub-source, this would mean that the sub-source somehow escaped detection by the CIC and he might possibly be able to move over into another JCP Cell on X installation. Whether the JCP would suspect him or not is unknown. If assuming that the JCP did not suspect that he was an informant, and allowed him to participate in the activities of another cell, or perhaps even use him as a nucleus to form a new cell, and subsequently the names of the members of the new cell were reported to USFJ, then USFJ would again discharge all the JCP members and/or sympathizers associated with that cell except the sub-source. It is reasonable to assume that the fact that the sub-source had escaped two house-cleanings under unusual circumstances, would alert the JCP which would

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

isolate him to such an extent that he would no longer be available as a source of information. In the interim, after the known members of JCP Cell #1 were discharged for security reasons, it is reasonable to assume that the other four cells whose members are not known would reorganize and perhaps become inactive for a time. Should this happen, the JCP personalities of the other four cells might never be known to A or the CIC, yet they would continue to be operating on X installation. It is best to wait until such time as the identities of the other cell members are known before the persons are discharged. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A was informed by the representative from this office that the matter would be taken into consideration by higher headquarters and that a decision would be forthcoming in the near future.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A feels that the fact that there is a list of sub-sources in the possession of USFJ which stipulates that these sources are not to be discharged does not solve the problem of A. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As pointed out above in the case of the one known cell and the four unknown cells, the release of all except the sub-source may very well work to immobilize the sub-source. It may be seen

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

that the release of even one cell member at a crucial time during the investigation of the structure on a particular installation, could cause the cells to tighten security, reorganize, disband or whatever tends to confuse organs attempting to penetrate. Coordination in the release of all JCP members and sympathizers is desired. [REDACTED]

Presently, only A is

concerned in this study, but should some satisfactory arrangement be made whereby CIC could continue to work with A and the situation on X installation be brought under control, then this office could duplicate the procedure with B thru X [REDACTED]

The estimated manpower requirements to accomplish such coordination and reporting of information developed is one Special Agent with linguistic ability, fulltime, until the project is brought under control.

Respecting coordination between this office and installations concerned, the maintaining of a card file on personalities that A requests that USFJ not discharge should be sufficient, providing this office is able to coordinate with the Labor Liaison Officer and obtain a list of individuals scheduled for discharge whenever a reduction in force is necessary. Considering that RIF notices are giveⁿ out thirty days in advance of discharge, this office would have time to file check the names against its cards to insure that A's request is honored.

Respecting who should make the final determination regarding whether or not a JCP member should or should not be discharged due to the sensitiveness of his position, this office is not in a position to make that decision. [REDACTED]

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D) 5 USC 552a (b) (1)

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

[REDACTED]

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

[REDACTED] However, this office should be notified so that A can be alerted to the action and make alternate plans. The administrative arrangements between higher headquarters and relating to the discharge of persons whom A has requested that they not be discharged need be explored. Presuming that Security Group, after receiving the information from CIC that a particular person employed at X installation is a JCP member or sympathizer and that A has expressed the desire to have the person remain employed on X installation, reports that fact to the higher headquarters of X, then the decision as to whether or not the person in question will be allowed to remain employed most probably is made by installation X's higher headquarters. In that case, the commander of X installation is merely advised that there is a specific person on X installation associated with the JCP and for security reasons he is directed to discharge him. If this is the normal practice, then it would seem logical for Security Group to advise the higher headquarters of X that it is not in the best interests of Security Group [REDACTED] that the person be discharged at this time. Further, Security Group might recommend that the higher headquarters of X installation advise the X installation commander of the situation should the higher headquarters deem it appropriate that he be aware of the situation. Or should the higher headquarters of X feel that it is advisable from the standpoint of

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

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security, to provide X installation commander with only sufficient information to make him aware that there is sufficient reason for not discharging a particular person at this time without stating the specific reasons therefore, then such an arrangement serves to relieve the X installation commander of responsibility in the case. However, the relationships between Security Group, X installation's higher headquarters, and X would have to be resolved on the basis of staff study and coordination at the Security Group level.

Presuming that Security Group, after having received the information referred to above, reports that fact to X installations' higher headquarters, and the higher headquarters passes the information to X installation commander for whatever action he deems necessary, then this office could coordinate with the X installation commander and obtain his cooperation to insure that A's interests are considered. In such a case, to protect the installation commander from the responsibility of knowingly allowing JCP members and/or sympathizers to remain employed on X installation, a Memo for Record, properly classified, and signed by the SAIC of this office could be so worded as to back up the X installation commander. [REDACTED] This course of action is dependent upon whether or not the relationships between Security Group, X installation's higher headquarters and X are as stated above, and whether or not this office is or will be granted authority to deal with the X installation commander in event the procedure is as stated above.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] to be specific the following example is cited. On 29 June 1956, A submitted information to this

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5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

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3 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

office. This office reported the information received thru channels and it arrived at Security Group. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is a relatively new undertaking and falls short of perfection. In any event, the order protects A because it insures that A is not supplying information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This office originally went to A to obtain the information because A had the information.

As stated above, the order has not been strictly enforced. The reasons for not enforcing it are varied but among them there appears to be one which encompasses a considerable expenditure of US dollars. [REDACTED]

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

Thereafter, to maintain a good working relationship with A, also calls for an occasional expenditure of funds and manhours. It would seem that the funds expended and the manhours required are worthwhile [REDACTED]

The reason for maintaining a good working relationship with A is that the information is timely, accurate, with some qualifications, and that A prefers to do business directly with this office.

That action on the part of USFJ in releasing JCP members and sympathizers without coordinating the action with A [REDACTED]

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D) 5 USC 552a (b) (1)

Therefore, A, being closest to the problem, is in the best position to observe.

Past experience tends to bear out the contention that CIC obtains better results in obtaining the desired information if it works directly with A.

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

[REDACTED] It has happened that A volunteered information to this office [REDACTED] without our having to request it. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Of course this consideration is one of operational convenience rather than a direct implication that A furnished more or better information than [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is possible that this office could receive the same information from A [REDACTED] In fact, this too has happened.

That this office does not have any sources of information presently supplying data identical to that of A is qualified. [REDACTED] are supplying the same information to this office. [REDACTED]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

That the present and future prospects of this office's recruiting its own sources to replace or augment those of A is not gratifying, is recognized. The sources in this field and previously used by this office were dropped or otherwise given disposition on instructions from higher headquarters. This office has screened its files in an effort to discover some of the personalities formerly

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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

used as sources. In two instances, the persons no longer had access, or were either not in a position to resume a working relationship with this office. This office maintains a continual alertness to the possibility of source development and will continue to exploit all possibilities. The problems and prospects for source recruitment could well be compiled into a separate staff study. However, it appears significant to relate that on the surface there appear two considerations of interest. First, money alone is not always the answer to source recruitment. Secondly, the USFJ is in a position to secure a potential source's discharge from a USFJ installation, or to insure that he remains employed on some USFJ installation. Generally, these two inducements, coupled with the usual appeal to patriotism, are the means by which this office could seek to recruit a source. It would be a fair statement to say that a source or sources could be recruited using these means alone provided the potential source was susceptible to these inducements. Other techniques of consequence appear to be limited.

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (f)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

[REDACTED]

Not in defense of this office's failure to recruit sources with access in this particular capacity, but merely as a matter of comparison, it would be interesting to note how many sources with similar access have been recruited by any office of the CIC in Japan since 1952. Specifically, how many sources does CIC have with access at the "JCP Cell

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

Operating on a USFJ Installation" level that have been recruited since 1952. The limited number, if any, tends to indicate the difficulty of recruitment. The function of source recruitment remains regardless of the difficulties involved and this office will do all in its power to insure that no possibilities are overlooked.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Conclusions: That this office possibly could obtain information relating to the identity of JCP members and sympathizers from A [REDACTED]. Having obtained the information so far as is known by A, this office could report it to higher headquarters. The JCP members and sympathizers could be discharged within a short period of time causing the remaining members to disband, reorganize, or accomplish other security measures to stop the flow of information. Meanwhile, A would lose faith [REDACTED] and become reluctant to release further information. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

That this office might arrange an agreement with higher headquarters that the persons reported by A not be discharged at this time. When all the personalities of the JCP Cells on X installation are known, then higher headquarters could insure that they are discharged. However, unless coordinated with A, A's future cooperation is questionable.

That this office might arrange an agreement with higher headquarters that the persons reported by A not be discharged at this time. Having secured this agreement, this office could be granted permission to continue working directly with A, and arrange the discharge of JCP personalities on X installation [REDACTED]

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5 USC 552a (b) (1) (U)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (U)

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

[REDACTED] Should it be within the purview of this office to do so, this office could make the necessary arrangements with the X installation commander and his labor liaison officer respecting the retention of persons concerned. The exact procedure to be followed is an administrative matter capable of solution.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It appears better to coordinate the matter with A directly [REDACTED]

This office could request that higher headquarters consider the prospect of granting this office permission to agree that the JCP personalities reported by A would not be discharged without coordinating the action with A first. [REDACTED]

Recommendation: That this office request higher headquarters to consider the possibilities and give its decision regarding the following:

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

Whether or not this office can promise A that the persons reported by A will not be discharged in certain cases; where A has requested that they remain;

Whether or not this office can promise A that the persons reported by A will not be discharged without coordinating the release with A first;

Whether or not this office may work out the necessary arrangements with the X installation commander and his labor liaison officer respecting the non-discharge of personalities [REDACTED]

Whether or not the coordination necessary to accomplish the desired results can be made on this office's level or on the Security Group level;

Whether or not this office can assure A that the personalities already reported will not be discharged pending a decision on this entire operational procedure;

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and in lieu of its acceptance, what specific plan has higher headquarters devised.

[REDACTED]

Major, MI (Arty)
SAIC

Capt. M. (by)

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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)
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5 USC 552a (b) (7) (C)

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Police Memorandum
file
26 April 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Visit to 2nd Medium Port, Yokohama, and Oppama Ordnance Depot

The following individuals attended a meeting at the 2nd Medium Port, Yokohama, 1000 hrs, 24 April 1956.

██████████ Chief, Security Group
██████████ Commanding Officer, 2nd Medium Port
██████████ S2, 2nd Medium Port
██████████ SAIC, Station 2, 3d Operations Group
██████████ Assistant S2, 3d Operations Group
██████████ Security Group

3 USC 552 (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)
The meeting was held to discuss the current placement of informants in the Port that are of interest to this organization and Security Group, since they are furnishing information relative to subversive activities in the Port area. It was pointed out to ██████████ that there were certain individuals within the installation at the present time ██████████ who in turn were furnishing 3d Operations Group with intelligence information. ██████████ indicated that his only interest in the individuals was that his S2, ██████████ be kept informed of the status of any individuals that were working on an informant basis in the Port. Other than that he would leave the entire operation up to our people and to his S2. He thanked us for our trouble and stated that if at any time he could be of further service, he would be glad to do so.

At 1400 hrs, the following individuals attended a conference at the Oppama Ordnance Depot to discuss individuals that were working in the installation ██████████. The individuals who attended this meeting were the following:

5 USC 552a (b) (1)
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██████████ Commanding Officer, Oppama Ordnance Depot
██████████ Chief, Security Group
██████████ Security Officer, Oppama Ordnance Depot
██████████ Commanding Officer, Station 2, 3d Operations Group
██████████ Assistant S2, 3d Operations Group
██████████ Security Group

██████████ explained the purpose of the visit and was confronted by ██████████ as to why no action had been taken on the G2 Holds. ██████████ explained that they were expediting the action and should have the matter cleared up soon. ██████████ then went on to explain the placement and control of individuals that were being used ██████████

██████████ stated that the ideal situation

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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was to permit these individuals to continue in their assigned slots, and requested [redacted] cooperation in this matter. [redacted] indicated that he would cooperate to the extent that we, referring to Security Group and 3d Operations Group, could control these informants that were active within his installation. That he did not desire to leave himself open to any criticism at a later date should something arise of a nature that would result in sabotage of the installation. [redacted] was informed that all necessary action had been taken to eliminate such incidents and that an agreement had been made [redacted] that should an emergency arise the individuals would be neutralized and removed if necessary. He went along with our recommendation to permit the individuals we were interested in to remain within the installation as long as they cooperated [redacted] He indicated that he wanted his security officer kept informed at all times and that he desired a close check on the individuals' productivity both as in regard to Intelligence and his normal job. Both [redacted] and myself assured him that his security officer would be kept informed through [redacted] office as to the individuals' productivity intelligence wise, but the individuals' work output was not within our jurisdiction.

Based on a discussion with [redacted] as we returned to Tokyo last night, he indicated that he was going to take another look at his Security Review Discharge Board procedures and determine why there was such a delay in the processing of the G2 Holds, and whether any additional derogatory information had been turned up that would expedite the release of the individuals on the G2 Hold list. And in accomplishing this, he felt that [redacted] would be more receptive as would other CO's in other installations should a similar request be made of them. He thanked this organization for their trouble and assistance and for the briefing that was given him prior to his entry into either of the two installations and was sorry that we had been put to so much trouble. He further stated, that he felt that now that everyone concerned had a clearer picture of what had happened regarding the G2 Holds we could probably eliminate anything like that occurring in the future.

[redacted]
Major Ord
Asst S2

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY

CLASSIFICATION (If any)

SAB-422

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FILE NO. CIS-709
XF-3-202011

SUBJECT JCP PENETRATION OF US/UN INSTALLATIONS

TO Hq, 441st CIC Gp
APO 613
ATTN: S2 (SAB)FROM OIC, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Gp
APO 613DATE 22 April 1957 COMMENT NO. 1
[REDACTED] ds/9497/3171

1. Late in 1956, an Agent of the Yokohama Resident Agency, Tokyo Field Office, 441st CIC Group, APO 613, obtained information of a derogatory nature concerning the following named six persons from [REDACTED] O-10:

- a. [REDACTED]
- b. [REDACTED]
- c. [REDACTED]
- d. [REDACTED]
- e. [REDACTED]
- f. [REDACTED]

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2. Later, Security Group requested a National Agency Check, the results of which indicated there was no derogatory information concerning the six persons.

3. On 15 April 1957, [REDACTED] O-10 was again requested for information concerning the six persons and it resulted in verification of derogatory information concerning [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] but there was no derogatory information concerning [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]

4. At the time of the request for information (par 3 above), O-10 advised the Agent that O-10 was willing to submit any and all information pertaining to the covert organization of the Japan Communist Party (JCP), JCP personalities, and related JCP information which pertained to JCP members who are employed on United States Forces, Japan (USFJ) installations, provided our organization would promise that the JCP members and sympathizers would not be released from their present employment. O-10 attempted to justify this statement with the following:

a. In 1954, O-10 submitted the names of JCP members and sympathizers employed at the Japan Engineer Supply Center. Subsequently, the persons reported upon were discharged. [REDACTED]

5. At the present time, O-10 is willing to supply information only in the event this organization has previous substantiating data pertaining to JCP members or sympathizers who are employed on a USFJ installation. In this connection, the installations at which there are JCP cells and the number of JCP members

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 96

REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 48, WHICH MAY BE USED

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67-125-Army-AG Admin Cen-Japan-25MM

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SAB-422

File No: CIS-709 XF-3-202011
Subject: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations

5 USC 552 (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)
22 April 1957
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

employed on USFJ installations has been reported but the identity of the individuals is being withheld until O-10 can be assured by this organization that none of the persons reported will be discharged. O-10 gives the following reasons to justify this action:

a. [REDACTED]

b. The discharge of only those JCP members and sympathizers who are not O-10 sub-sources, compromises those sub-sources.

c. In the legal appeal of a JCP member who has been discharged for security reasons, the fact that O-10 supplied the adverse information must be disclosed. [REDACTED]

d. O-10 feels that the best solution is to allow the subversives to remain employed on USFJ installations so that O-10 will be in a position to observe their activity and report to USFJ without fear of compromise.

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

Major, MI(OrdC)

XF-3-202011

TO: CIC, Tokyo FO FROM: Hq, 441st CIC Gp 27 May 1957 COMMENT NO. 2 (8)
441st CIC Gp /gam/9497-3361

1. Information contained in Comment 1, above, has been brought to the attention of higher headquarters. Recommend that the following action be taken in this matter:

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5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

XF-3-202011

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

27 May 1957

SUBJECT: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations (S)(u)

b. [REDACTED]

c. [REDACTED]

d. However, when several security discharges at a single installation are indicated, such discharges may be spaced out over a period of time if this is necessary to minimize the chances of compromising [REDACTED]

2. With reference to paragraph 5 c, Comment 1, above, the likelihood that source would be called as a witness appears remote. Security Group has no knowledge that this ever happened in past security discharge appeals. Inasmuch as the USFJ flatly refuses any involvement in security discharge appeals, there is no danger that source would be compromised from that quarter.

3. It is felt that the above should solve the problem [REDACTED]

4. Advise this headquarters of any further developments in this matter.

5. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 USC 552a (b) (1) (7) (D)
5 USC 552a (b) (1) (7) (D)

S2

Maj, MI (OrdC)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

XF-3-202011

TO: SAIG, Yokohama RA
Tokyo FO, 441st CIC Gp
APO 613

FROM: OIC, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Gp
APO 613

DATE: 28 May 1957 COMMENT NO. 3
[REDACTED] db/9497-3177 (S)

1. Attention is invited to Comment #2 and the instructions contained therein.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAB-422

XF-3-202011

SUBJECT: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations (S)(U)

28 May 1957

2. An Agent Report, Subject and file as above, concerning those persons mentioned in paragraph 1, Comment 1, has been prepared and is being held by the 441st CIC Detachment Case Control Officer pending receipt of your reply.

3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
[REDACTED]

Maj, MI (Arty)

OIC

TO: OIC, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Gp
APO 613

FROM: SAIC, Yokohama RA, DATE: 3 June 57
Tokyo FO,
441st CIC Gp
APO 503

COMMENT NO. 4 (9)

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

3. Any further developments in this matter will be reported upon receipt.

4. Attached is a draft Memo for Record prepared by S/A [REDACTED] which may explain more fully the entire situation.

5. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

1 Incl
Memo for Record

[REDACTED]

Major, MI (Arty)
Special Agent in Charge

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAB-422

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

XF-3-202011

SUBJECT: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations (u) (s) (22 Apr 57)

TO: CO, 441st CIC Gp
APO 613

FROM: OIC, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Gp
APO 613

DATE: 8 June 1957

COMMENT NO. 5

ab/9497-3177 (s)

1. Reference draft staff study, Yokohama RA, Tokyo FO, attached to the original only.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

2. Without repeating the study, Yokohama Resident Agency, forwarded by Comment 4, there appears to be additional considerations and justifications for reviewing our relationships [REDACTED]

3. Reference Comment 2, paragraph 1:

a. [REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED]

c. The USFJ security mission might be better served in some instances if security discharge action were withheld, notwithstanding a preponderance of derogatory information.

d. [REDACTED]

4. The crux of the matter is consideration of the attached study with a view toward granting Yokohama RA authority to:

b. Coordinate with installation commanders and labor liaison officers concerning the retention of known JCP members as employees of the installations concerned.

c. Establish files and procedures designed to implement a program in keeping with a and b above.

d. [REDACTED]

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5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (7)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3AB-422

XF-3-202011

SUBJECT: JCP Penetration of US/UN Installations (u) (22 Apr 57)

8 Jun 57

5. Should such a proposal [REDACTED] - Security Group cooperation be considered feasible, it is anticipated that coverage of the counterintelligence mission of CIC will be considerably improved. [REDACTED]

1 Incl
n/c

[REDACTED]
OIC

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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29 March 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

1. In compliance with DF, Headquarters, 441st CIC Group, subject as above, dated 6 March 1957, and succeeding verbal instructions, the following installation commanders have been contacted and the previously reported course of action was explained to them:

a. [REDACTED] Deputy Commander, Yokohama US Army Terminal Port. [REDACTED] acting on behalf of the Port Commander, heartily approved of the plan and stated that he would be pleased [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Port Command includes the listed sources located at Tomioka, the Cargo Motor Pool and the Provost Marshal's Office.

b. [REDACTED] Commander, Japan Procurement Agency. [REDACTED] was very cooperative and stated that he would notify this office of any future plans of reduction in force action handled by his office, so that this unit may be informed earlier of action that may affect other sources. This action may be beneficial because the JPA negotiates contractual labor for all US Army installations.

c. [REDACTED] Commander, Oppama Ordnance Depot. [REDACTED] heartily concurred in the action, but stated that a problem may arise in trying to protect the job of sources employed by contractors. [REDACTED] requested that the plan be explained to his Security Officer, [REDACTED] who is charged with maintaining all Japanese national files and administrative action concerning security matters pertaining to these individuals. [REDACTED] was briefed and afterwards stated that in the event a person employed by one of the contractors should be scheduled for discharge, he would take action to place the individual in another job. This includes sources located at Nippi Motors, Fuji Motors and Shin-Nippi, at Oppama.

d. [REDACTED] Commander, Camp Fuchinobe. [REDACTED] approved of the plan and stated that he appreciated the fact that this unit [REDACTED] have taken positive action to keep him informed on labor and security matters. Camp Fuchinobe is under control of Camp Zama, but labor and security problems are the direct responsibility of the Camp Fuchinobe Commander.

2. Two attempts were made to contact the Japan Engineer Supply Center Commander with negative results. The JESC commander will be contacted within the near future and a report submitted. [REDACTED]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (A)

SAB-453

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

Subject: [REDACTED]

29 March 1957

[REDACTED]

3.

[REDACTED]

Reported information will indicate the source as O-10.

4. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

[REDACTED]

Major, MI (Arty)
SAIC

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14 March 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

1. In compliance with DF, Headquarters, 441st CIC Group, subject as above, dated 6 March 1957, [REDACTED] Deputy Post Commander, was contacted by the SAIC, Station 2, at 1100 hours 11 March 1957, for the purpose of discussing the plan outlined in referenced DF. The plan was explained to [REDACTED] and received his concurrence one hundred percent. At 1300 hours 11 March 1957, [REDACTED] Commanding Officer, Japan Procurement Agency, was contacted concerning this same matter and [REDACTED] also gave one hundred percent concurrence.

2. These two commanders were contacted prior to devising a procedure [REDACTED] in order to observe their reaction when the plan was presented to the commanders. No difficulties were encountered with these two commanders, therefore, a workable program was devised and presented [REDACTED]

3. At 0930 hours 13 March 1957, a discussion was held with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This information will be transmitted to Headquarters by AR, indicating the source with a numbering code system. The information will be transmitted verbally to the installation commanders concerned by agents of this unit. The list of sources, their position, employing installation and code designation will be on file at Headquarters, 441st CIC, SAB Office, Station 2 [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] was asked to take precautionary measures to insure that the sources do not become aware that they are being protected in any respect. Installation commanders contacted and those to be contacted were will be cautioned not to reveal the plan to their subordinates and by all means not to single out the sources by preferential or other treatment.

[REDACTED]
Major, MI (Arty)
SAIC

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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

XP-3-102378(0)

OIC, Tokyo FO
441st CIC Gp

Hq, 441st CIC Gp

6 March 1957

gam/9497-3361

1. Reference:

a. Letter (2), AC of S, G2, AFPE/8A (Rear), SUBJECT: Security File Check on Alien Employees Occupying or Utilized in Non-Sensitive Positions, dated 12 February 1957 (Inclosure I).

b. Memorandum for the Record (2), SUBJECT as above, dated 13 February 1957 (Inclosure II).

c. Conference relative to SUBJECT attended by [REDACTED], S2, Tokyo FO; [REDACTED] OIC, Yokohama RA; and [REDACTED], SAB, this headquarters, held at this headquarters on 14 February 1957.

2. [REDACTED] attached Memorandum for the Record, AC of S, G2, AFPE/8A (Rear), Security Group, has directed that local Counterintelligence units will maintain liaison with [REDACTED] installation commanders on matters pertaining to subversive activity and the control of information obtained [REDACTED] within United States Forces Japan (USFJ) installations. [REDACTED] This information will in turn be released by CIC to the USFJ installation commanders concerned.

3. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XF-3-102378(0)

6 March 1957

[REDACTED]

5. In the event any of the commanders demand [REDACTED] they will be advised of the sensitivity of this type information and that it can only be released to the commanding officers directly. That if the information is released, it must be treated on a strict "Need to Know" basis. Explain that knowledge of identity, if it is not used discretely, may draw attention to the source and will in all probability reduce the source's effectiveness.

6. This headquarters will be furnished pertinent information relative to the results of discussions with installation commanders concerning SUBJECT. Further, this headquarters will be informed as expeditiously as possible as to what arrangements were made between Yokohama RA [REDACTED] Information forwarded this headquarters concerning sources should include identity, placement, and an explanation of the code system that is devised.

7. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

2 Incl
MRF
Ltr

S2

Maj, MI (OrdC)

MEMO FOR THE RECORD:

1. Reference: Info contained in this DF was discussed in detail at Yokohama on 14 Feb 57.
2. Action Required: As is directed in basic communication
3. Action Taken: Instant DF makes a matter of record the instructions
4. Coordination: None
5. Copies: Normal
6. 6 Mar 57, [REDACTED], Capt

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SA FILE COPY
MRR/ML/2/3/END/gam

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.



Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.



Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.



Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 113-118

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5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 Feb 57

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

1. Reference previous memorandums, this headquarters [redacted] and recent DF to Det C, this headquarters, dated 31 Jan 57, recommending appointment of S/A [redacted] Sta #2, Det C as operational level representative to attend joint conference [redacted] Scty Gp, and 3d Opr Gp) on the disposition of these informants.

2. The counter-proposal of Det C (i.e., that S/A [redacted] not attend, and that [redacted] and S/A [redacted] represent the operational arm of this headquarters.) was discussed this date with [redacted] XO, this headquarters. It was indicated during this discussion that, based on recent developments in the Yokohama area, considerable embarrassment and possible jeopardy to the local mission of Sta #2 might result if the counter proposal outlined above were implemented. It was recommended that only the representative of this headquarters, [redacted] attend the joint conference.

3. [redacted] approved this recommendation and indicated that no reply to the counter-proposal was necessary, in the interests of harmony and the accomplishment of the mission.

4. Among specifics discussed at this time, which led to the recommendation made above, were the following:

a. During the latter part of November 1956, the CO, this headquarters expressed concern at the lack of coverage effected by Sta #2 during the major port strike in the Yokohama area. The SAIC, Sta #2, explained this lack of coverage by stating that his unit had no informants in the labor field. It was subsequently explained that two of the most productive sources in the labor field were at that time being handled by agents of Sta #2. The SAIC, Sta #2 was apparently unaware of this fact.

b. During a conference held in Dec 57 at the request of the SAIC, Sta #2, for the ostensible purpose of outlining specific targets in the leftist field (in the Sta #2 area) another revelation came to light. The SAIC, Sta #2, who had made this request during the recent S2 Command Inspection of his unit, stated that no assistance was required relative to recognition of leftist targets in his area. The difficulty being met pertained solely to the recruitment of suitable sources in the target field. Full scale effort to fill the source vacuum had been taken without success. Description of the efforts revealed that they had been confined to consulting with interpreter translator personnel of Station #2, [redacted]

5. The joint meeting which [redacted] will attend as representative of this headquarters will take place on 8 Feb 57. Coordination will be effected with Security Group before the conference to insure completed action in the best interests of the counterintelligence mission.

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6. It is to be noted that the conference discussed in paragraph 4b, above, was not in any way influenced by personnel of the S2 Section who attended it. Revelation of the methods used to recruit suitable informants was made by Sta #2 representatives. It is significant that not a single comment was injected into the discussion by operational control personnel of Detachment C, indicating possible conflict of ideas or disapproval of the methods being utilized in this important effort in the Yokohama area.


Maj, MI (OrdC)
S2

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 APR 1999
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)
5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY

Memo for Record:

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

30 April 56

On 24 April 1956 representatives of G2, AFPE/8A (Rear) conferred with the Commanding Officers of US Army Port, Yokohama and Oppama Ordnance Depot relative to certain Japanese employees of these units who were determined security risks by the AFPE/8A (Rear) Security Discharge Review Board, but on whom G2 representation had been made for their retention due to the fact that they are valuable

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Upon discussion of the problem with [REDACTED] Commanding Officer, US Army Port, Yokohama, he [REDACTED] concurred in the necessity for retention of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in the interest of improved counterintelligence coverage of his installation.

[REDACTED] Commanding Officer, Oppama Ordnance Depot, was next interviewed and stated substantially as follows: He [REDACTED] would agree to the retention of [REDACTED] on condition that if and when [REDACTED] Manifests any action deemed detrimental to the security of the installation, he [REDACTED] would immediately request authority from proper authorities for the removal of [REDACTED] from the installation. [REDACTED] was assured of immediate G2 support in this regard.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Representatives of 3rd Operations Group contacted [REDACTED] Commanding Officer TQMD, on 27 April 1956. [REDACTED] concurred in the request for retention of [REDACTED]

This is not a G2 highlight.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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[REDACTED] Lt Col, Inf
Action Officer
969-3368

Encl 6

5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)
5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

23 April 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Visit to G2, Security Group

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

1. At 0945 hrs, 23 Apr 56, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] visited G2, Security Group, and talked to [REDACTED] concerning [REDACTED] Yokohama Port and Oppama Ordinance Depots. The following persons were present at the meeting:

[REDACTED] Security Group
[REDACTED] Security Group
[REDACTED] 3d Operations Group
[REDACTED] 3d Operations Group
[REDACTED] Security Group

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

2. [REDACTED] briefed [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] CO of Station 2, Detachment C, and his trip to this headquarters Saturday, 21 Apr 56. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] then gave the correspondence relative to the twelve "G2 Holds" that are presently employed at the Oppama Ordinance Depot. [REDACTED] immediately recognized the position he and [REDACTED] would be in on tomorrow's meetings with the Commanding Officers of the Yokohama Port and the Oppama Ordinance Depot. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] to check Security Group records to determine what action has been taken on the twelve listed "G2 Holds".

3. Next was a discussion relative to the wording of a letter that [REDACTED] was going to ask each of the commanding officers to sign on tomorrow's visit. [REDACTED] pointed out that [REDACTED] had stated that because of his close association with these commanding officers he believed that they would be reluctant to sign any document granting permission for members of the JCP to remain on the installations. It was agreed at this time that no letter be prepared for tomorrow's trip. [REDACTED] called [REDACTED] and explained the situation to him and recommended that no letter be taken on tomorrow's trip. [REDACTED] agreed.

4. [REDACTED] then stated that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had appointments at 1000 hrs tomorrow with the Commanding Officer of Yokohama Port, and at 1400 hrs tomorrow with the Commanding Officer of Oppama Ordinance Depot. [REDACTED] suggested that a meeting, prior to 1000 hrs, with [REDACTED] in Yokohama would be beneficial. [REDACTED] indicated that this could be done. [REDACTED] then made plans for necessary transportation for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] so that they could be in [REDACTED] office by 0930 tomorrow morning.

5. [REDACTED] then brought the results of a file check on the twelve individuals to [REDACTED] office (a copy of this file check is attached).

6. [REDACTED] then requested [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to accompany him to [REDACTED] office for the purpose of briefing the Colonel on the

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5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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current status of [REDACTED] the twelve "G2 Holds".
[REDACTED] briefed
[REDACTED] on all of the above information. Plans were then finalized
for tomorrow's meeting with [REDACTED] and the Commanding Officers of
Yokohama Port and Oppama Ordinance Depot.

[REDACTED]
Major Ord
Asst S2

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

19 April 1956

SUBJECT: Visit to G2, Security Group

(b)(7)(D) 1. At 1000 hours, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of this headquarters visited G2, Security Group, and talked to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] concerning the following topics:

a. [REDACTED] read a letter that was given him by [REDACTED]. This letter concerned [REDACTED].

b. [REDACTED] read a tab to a G2 Staff Study that will be presented to the Chief of Staff, AFCE. In this tab the background of the whole problem concerning [REDACTED] on USFJ installations is discussed with specific instances being mentioned.

(1) The tab points out certain personalities that are presently being utilized [REDACTED]

(2) Also discussed in the tab is the problem of informing local commanders of USFJ installations of the presence of [REDACTED]

(3) With regard to this, [REDACTED] stated that next week he plans [REDACTED] suggested that it might be well if a representative of [REDACTED] as well as a member of the [REDACTED] accompanied him. [REDACTED] indicated that this could be done.

(b)(7)(C) c. [REDACTED] allowed [REDACTED] to read a translation of a letter that [REDACTED] stated that even though [REDACTED] has indicated that they are not concerned with [REDACTED] tions, they might be interested in a copy of the letter. He said that it is possible that [REDACTED] has received or will receive a similar request from [REDACTED]. Also that it would be wise to have a copy of the letter in Security Group files in case G2 gets wind of it and wants an explanation. [REDACTED] requested that two copies of the letter and a certified translation of the letter be forwarded to him so that he can send a copy to [REDACTED] and have a copy for Security Group files. [REDACTED] replied that [REDACTED] will forward copies of the letter as requested.

[REDACTED]
1st Lt [REDACTED] INF
Source Analysis Officer

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

3 March 1956

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE S2:

SUBJECT: Visit to G2, AFPE/8A (Rear) (Security Group)

1. On 2 March 1956, the undersigned visited [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] at G2, AFPE/8A (Rear) from 1530 to 1640 hours. Purpose of the visit was to advise [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Contact with [REDACTED] had as its purpose a query relative to administrative requirements of his branch which might assist in a reduction of unessential reporting procedures which are adversely affecting the operations of the CE Branch, this Headquarters.

2. [REDACTED] stated that he had no knowledge of the background of the situation which resulted in the submission of investigative reports of this Headquarters by Disposition Form. He advised that format was not a primary consideration, and that for all purposes the Agent Report would be adequate, and in fact preferable, since designation of source, and evaluation of both source and information, contained in the Agent Report, would be of benefit to his office in normal analysis of the reports. He stated further that any type of transmittal form would be satisfactory, and requested only that the reports continue to be enclosed in sealed envelopes during transmission by our Headquarters, to preclude the contents being made accessible to persons who have no legitimate interest in the information.

3. [REDACTED] was informed by the undersigned, in answer to his query (contained in Memorandum for the Record, copy attached, concerning a previous meeting), [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that the individual of whom 3d Opr Gp had not been advised [REDACTED] was the person in whom he was most interested. This individual, [REDACTED]

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5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED] is in a position to aid the intelligence effort considerably. [REDACTED] has a

tentative plan for G2 approval which includes the following action: (1) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] will be contacted and requested to make formal notification to 3d Opr Gp (local level) of the identity of the third informant [REDACTED]

(2) At the meeting of the Discharge Review Board, scheduled for 7 Mar 56,

[REDACTED] will request the board to suspend discharge action on these individuals in view of their value to the intelligence effort [REDACTED]

b1
b3
per
CIA

[REDACTED] (3) At a later date, the Commanding Officer of the Oppama Ordnance Depot will be thoroughly briefed on the situation and his cooperation requested. The true facts will not be concealed and every assurance of flow of necessary information to the Depot (Scty Officer) will be given, with recommendations for security of the information. It will probably be necessary to remove a number of the underlings involved in the cell, but retention of the key informant [REDACTED] and a skeleton JCP unit will be necessary. Maximum control of the activities of the informant will be insured. [REDACTED]

5 USC 552a (b) (1)
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

[REDACTED] Commanding Officer of Security Officer will be informed of developments by 3d Opr Gp representatives, and information will be passed through Hq, 3d Opr Gp to G2 (Scty Gp). Neither the responsibility for the operation nor to the Depot Commander for the security of the installation would fall to 3d Opr Gp.

[REDACTED] made substantially this statement after the undersigned had remarked, per instructions, that these responsibilities were beyond the scope of the 3d Opr Gp. [REDACTED] stated that he would like to know [REDACTED] reaction to attendance by representatives of 3d Opr Gp Headquarters, Det C,

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and Station 2 at the Depot Commander's briefing [REDACTED] was advised by the undersigned that his request would be made known to the S2, this Headquarters, and that a reply to the question could be expected.

4. No decisions, policy, or commitments were made during this discussion.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

[REDACTED]
Capt [REDACTED] Arty
S2 Section

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 APR 1999
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

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- ☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

3 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 128-130

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

21 Dec 1955

Conference held at 1330 hours, 21 Dec 55., in the office of Chief of C&A Branch, Security Group, was attended by the following individuals:

[REDACTED] Scty Gp
[REDACTED] Scty Gp
[REDACTED] Hq 3d Opr Gp
[REDACTED] Hq 3d Opr Gp

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

[REDACTED] started off the conference with the following information:

Based on information received from Hq 3d Opr Gp., regarding Japanese Nationals [REDACTED] employed by New Japan Aircraft Manufacturing Co (Nippi Motors), contractor of Oppama Ordnance Depot; [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] employed at 2d Transportation Major Port) employees of USFJ, Scty Gp notified the Commanding Officers of the installation concerned, that information had been received which indicated the individuals might be considered as security risks and that the information was to be presented to the AFPE/8A Security Discharge Review Committee (SDRC) for a decision as to whether the information was sufficient for releasing the individuals as security risk.

Security Group's procedure in cases of this nature is to check with [REDACTED] for substantiating information prior to presenting the information to the SDRC. In the case of these 3 individuals, [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] stated that the 3 individuals were [REDACTED] informants and were well controlled by [REDACTED]. These individuals were actively participating in JCP activities to furnish [REDACTED] with information re (1) JCP infiltration of Security Forces Employees Unions, (2) Anti-U.S. Activities, and (3) information re All Security Forces Workers Union (ZEN CHURO).

[REDACTED] further stated that he would appreciate Scty Gp taking necessary action to prevent the individuals from being discharged. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] that if [REDACTED] superior approved [REDACTED] request, could [REDACTED] cooperate on the following points; (1) furnish full information on a timely basis all the information received from the three individuals, (2) implement a plan to insure immediate removal of the three individuals and their contacts in an emergency or near emergency, (3) that control of the individuals be coordinated at the local level [REDACTED] and 3d Opr Gp, and (4) to preclude a reoccurrence of this situation, [REDACTED] furnish Scty Gp with a list of all [REDACTED] informants on US/UN installations. [REDACTED] stated that he would agree with the first three points but not number four for various reasons. [REDACTED] stated that he would furnish Scty Gp with list of U.S. installations on which [REDACTED] has key informant.

[REDACTED] stated that he desired 3d Opr Gp to not take any action on this matter [REDACTED]. Further [REDACTED] requested recommendations from 3d Opr Gp re [REDACTED] request to not release the individuals and the four points tentatively agreed on by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. With special consideration given to the point pertaining to the control of the three individuals by coordination between local level [REDACTED] and 3d Opr Gp.

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